The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy by Pekola, P
2018 Studies in social security and health | 148
14 8
Piia Pekola
The effects of com
petition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy
Different market mechanisms are used increasingly in health care 
around the world. Competition is hoped to improve efficiency and 
quality without raising costs. One mechanism of increasing 
competition among providers is the patients’ freedom of choice. 
Especially when prices are regulated, free choice is expected to 
incentivise providers to seek volume through increasing quality
and thereby make the system beneficial for all parties – patients, 
providers and the regulator.
This seems like a straightforward mechanism. However, many
aspects – such as imperfect information – affecting provider
incentives must be considered for competition to be effective in 
health care. This study shows that despite the apparently
competitive operational environment, competition may not have 
a desired effect on quality after all. The reason is most likely
found in imperfect information and the lack of incentives it
produces.
ISBN      978-952-284-033-2 (print)
ISBN      978-952-284-034-9 (pdf)
ISSN-L   1238-5050
ISSN      1238-5050 (print)
ISSN      2323-7724 (pdf)
The Social Insurance Institution 
of Finland
Kela Research
Phone +358 20 634 11
julkaisut@kela.fi
www.kela.fi/research
www.kela.fi/tutkimus
www.fpa.fi/forskning
9
3
9
8
8
2
2
7
5
4
0
3
2
                                                
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
2018 Studies in social security and health | 148 
Piia Pekola 
The effects of competition 
and regulation on quality
in physiotherapy 

  
 
 
Studies in social security and health 148 | 2018 
Piia Pekola
The effects of competition
and regulation on quality
in physiotherapy
Author
Piia Pekola, M.Soc.Sc. (Political Science), MHS (Health Economics)
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
firstname.lastname@stm.fi
The publications in this series have undergone a formal referee 
process.
© Author and Kela
Layout: Pekka Loiri
ISBN 978-952-284-033-2 (print)
ISBN 978-952-284-034-9 (pdf)
ISSN-L 1238-5050
ISSN 1238-5050 (print)
ISSN 2323-7724 (pdf)
URI http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe201802053103
Publisher: Kela, Helsinki, 2018
Printed by Erweko
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy
 
 
Abstract	 Pekola P. The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy.
Helsinki: The Social Insurance Institution of Finland, Studies in social security and 
health 148, 2018. 132 pp. ISBN 978-952-284-033-2 (print), 978-952-284-034-9
(pdf). 
In health care, different market mechanisms have become more 
common in many countries. Competition is believed to increase 
quality, especially when prices are fixed and patients have a free 
choice of providers. Intuition dictates that when patients have 
more choice among providers, demand will be more responsive 
to quality and firms will only be able to increase revenue by rais­
ing quality. Previous literature on quality competition is mainly 
from the United Kingdom and the United States, and research has 
focused primarily on hospital markets. The aim of this study was 
to evaluate the effect competition and regulation have on quality 
in physiotherapy for disabled individuals organised and financed 
by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela). Thus, with 
this thesis it is possible to expand the literature into rehabilitation, 
such as physiotherapy, which has previously drawn only little at­
tention. Kela generally uses competitive bidding in its effort to or­
ganise physiotherapy. When firms participate in tendering, they 
define both prices and quality in their tenders, and Kela scores 
these elements. In addition to organising competitive bidding, 
Kela has piloted fixed-price service vouchers during the contract 
period 2011–2014. In this system, where patients had a free choice 
of providers, only firms able to attract patients turned in revenue. 
Patient deductibles were not collected. A previous change in pro­
curement altered the competitive environment of the firms. Thus, 
the change in the system most likely had an impact on the firms’ 
incentives regarding quality investments. This thesis shows that 
when quality was measured as firms’ quality investments, com­
petition had a negative effect on quality despite the procurement 
mechanism and the pricing. 
Keywords: competition, regulation, quality, prices, customers, 
freedom of choice, health services, rehabilitation, rehabilitation 
services, physiotherapy, disabled persons, service vouchers, incen­
tives 
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Tiivistelmä Pekola P. Kilpailun ja sääntelyn vaikutus laatuun fysioterapiapalveluissa. Hel­
sinki: Kela, Sosiaali- ja terveysturvan tutkimuksia 148, 2018. 132 s. ISBN 978­
952-284-033-2 (nid.), 978-952-284-034-9 (pdf). 
Erilaisten markkinamekanismien käyttö on yleistynyt eri maiden 
terveyspalveluissa. Yleisesti ajatellaan, että kilpailu lisää laatua 
erityisesti silloin, kun hinnat ovat kiinteät ja asiakkaat voivat va­
paasti valita palveluntuottajansa. Intuitiivisesti järjestelmä toimii 
seuraavasti: kilpailun kiristyessä valinnanvapauden myötä asiak­
kaat valitsevat tuottajikseen parempaa laatua tuottavat yksiköt, 
ja siten parempaa laatua tuottavien yritysten voitot kasvavat. Ai­
kaisemmat kilpailua ja laatua käsittelevät tutkimukset analysoivat 
enimmäkseen sairaalamarkkinoita, ja tutkimuksia on tehty erityi­
sesti Yhdysvalloissa ja Britanniassa. Tämän väitöskirjatutkimuk­
sen tarkoituksena oli arvioida kilpailun ja sääntelyn vaikutuksia 
laatuun Kelan järjestämissä vaikeavammaisten fysioterapiapalve­
luissa. Näin ollen tämä väitöskirja laajentaa aikaisemman kirjal­
lisuuden näkökulmaa kuntoutuspalveluihin, kuten fysioterapiaan, 
joita ei ole aikaisemmin tästä näkökulmasta tutkittu. Yleensä Kela 
järjestää fysioterapiapalvelut kilpailuttamalla tuottajat. Osallis­
tuessaan kilpailutukseen yritykset määrittelevät tarjouksessaan 
sekä hinnan että laadun, ja Kela pisteyttää nämä tekijät. Sopi­
muskaudella 2011–2014 fysioterapiapalveluiden järjestämisessä 
kokeiltiin kiinteähintaista palveluseteliä kahdessa Kelan vakuu­
tuspiirissä. Tässä järjestelmässä sopimuksen saaneet yritykset 
tuottivat voittoa vain, jos asiakkaat valitsivat heidät tuottajak­
seen. Fysioterapian asiakkaat eivät maksa palvelusta omavastuuta. 
Edellä mainittu toimintaympäristön muutos todennäköisesti vai­
kutti yritysten insentiiveihin tuottaa laatua. Tulokset osoittivat, 
että kilpailu laski laatua huolimatta siitä, miten palvelut järjestet­
tiin tai miten hinta määräytyi. 
Avainsanat: kilpailu, sääntely, laatu, hinnat, asiakkaat, valinnan­
vapaus, terveyspalvelut, kuntoutus, kuntoutuspalvelut, fysiotera­
pia, vammaiset, vaikeavammaiset, palvelusetelit, kannustimet 
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy
 
  
 
Sammandrag Pekola P. Inverkan av konkurrens och reglering på fysioterapitjänster. Helsing­
fors: FPA, Social trygghet och hälsa, undersökningar 148, 2018. 132 s. ISBN 978­
952-284-033-2 (hft.), 978-952-284-034-9 (pdf). 
Det har blivit vanligare med olika marknadsmekanismer i sam­
band med hälso-och sjukvårdstjänster i många länder. I allmänhet 
anses det att konkurrens leder till bättre kvalitet, särskilt om pri­
serna är fasta och kunderna fritt kan välja serviceproducent. In­
tuitivt tänkt fungerar systemet på följande vis: när konkurrensen 
ökar på grund av valfriheten, väljer kunderna sådan enheter som 
producerar bättre kvalitet. Härav följer att de företag som pro­
ducerar bättre kvalitet ökar sina vinster. Tidigare undersökningar 
som behandlat konkurrens och kvalitet har i huvudsak analyserat 
sjukhusmarknader, och undersökningar har gjorts framför allt i 
USA och Storbritannien. Syftet med denna doktorsavhandling har 
varit att bedöma vilken inverkan konkurrens och reglering har på 
kvaliteten på fysioterapitjänster som ordnas av FPA för personer 
med svår funktionsnedsättning. Således utvidgar denna doktors­
avhandling den tidigare forskningslitteraturens perspektiv till 
rehabiliteringstjänster, t.ex. fysioterapi, vilka tidigare inte under­
sökts ur denna synvinkel. I regel ordnar FPA fysioterapitjänster 
genom att konkurrensutsätta producenterna. När företagen deltar 
i konkurrensutsättningen fastställer de i sina erbjudanden både 
priset och kvaliteten, och FPA poängsätter dessa faktorer. Under 
avtalsperioden 2011–2014 testades för ordnandet av fysiotera­
pitjänster servicesedlar med ett fast pris i två av FPA:s försäkrings­
distrikt. I det här systemet genererade de företag med vilka avtal 
ingåtts vinst bara om kunderna valt dem till sin serviceproducent. 
Fysioterapikunder betalar ingen självriskandel för tjänsterna. Den 
ovan beskrivna ändringen av systemet påverkade sannolikt inci­
tamenten för företagen att producera kvalitet. Resultaten i dok­
torsavhandlingen visar att konkurrensen försämrade kvaliteten 
oberoende av hur tjänsterna ordnades eller hur priset fastställdes. 
Nyckelord: konkurrens, reglering, kvalitet, priser, kunder, val­
frihet, hälsovårdstjänster, rehabilitering, rehabiliteringstjänster, 
fysioterapi, handikappade, servicesedlar, ekonomiska incitament 
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1 Introduction 
In the past two decades, many countries have undergone health care reforms that 
introduce competition between service providers. These reforms have been analysed 
particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States. The literature, mainly fo­
cusing on hospital markets, shows that competition between suppliers tends to re­
duce prices and encourage efficiency but its effect on quality is ambiguous. Generally, 
competition has a tendency to improve quality if prices are regulated, but the overall 
effect of competition on quality depends on, for example, the institutional structures 
of health care (see e.g. Gaynor and Town 2011; Propper 2012; Santos et al. 2017). 
One way to intensify competition among providers is to introduce patient choice to 
health care. Due to different insurance mechanisms, prices are often irrelevant to 
patients and, thus, freedom of choice forces firms to compete for patients on quality. 
(Gaynor and Town 2011; Gaynor et al. 2012; Propper 2012.) It is possible to empower 
patients by increasing choice: patients dissatisfied with the quality of service have 
the opportunity to seek another provider. As a result, low-quality providers lose and 
high-quality providers gain market shares. If low-quality providers want to stay ac­
tive in the market, they need to improve the quality of their services (Le Grand 2007). 
Finland is also planning a massive reform in its health and social care sector. The aim 
is that after 2020 patients will be able to choose among public, private or third sector 
primary care providers based on their individual preferences. In the intended system, 
counties (instead of the current municipalities) will be responsible for organising 
health services, money will follow patients, and providers will receive a fixed-rate 
compensation from the counties for their services. In addition to broadening the 
provider-mix, the system will most likely see widened use of different procurement 
mechanisms, such as competitive bidding, service vouchers and personal budgets. 
Previously described changes in the organisation of health services are about increas­
ing competition between providers, which, on the other hand, is hoped to improve 
productivity and quality of care1. 
Despite the wide consensus upon the need to reform the Finnish healthcare sector, 
there is so far no evidence of how firms will react to these changes. Thus, there is a 
need for research, especially on the incentive structures linked to the previous sys­
tem, because the ultimate goals of the reform, such as improved productivity and 
quality, cannot be reached unless firms have proper incentives. 
The need for the reform and the lack of evidence bring the story to the Social In­
surance Institution of Finland (Kela). Kela has a complementary role in the cur­
rent Finnish healthcare system and it is one of the biggest organisers and financers 
of rehabilitation services in Finland. Kela arranges rehabilitation services through 
See http://alueuudistus.fi/en/frontpage. 1
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competitive bidding, but during the contract period 2011–2014 fixed-price service 
vouchers were piloted in two Kela insurance districts. Service vouchers were in use 
in physiotherapy targeted at disabled individuals. Most likely, the pilot did not have 
an influence on patients but, due to price regulation, had an influence on providers. 
In addition to expanding the procurement mechanism to service vouchers, freedom 
of choice was also initiated in physiotherapy in 2011. This change affected both pa­
tients as well as providers despite patients having had the opportunity to influence 
choice even before 2011. Freedom of choice empowered patients because they now 
had the right to choose providers compared to the previous system, where they had 
the opportunity to influence choice but no official right to choose. In addition, free­
dom of choice also affects firms’ behaviour because it is a means to intensify competi­
tion between providers. 
Kela’s service voucher system offered an opportunity to analyse the effects of com­
petition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy and thereby to provide evidence 
of how changes in procurement and pricing affect firms’ incentive structures in the 
Finnish context. Thus, Kela’s reform could be considered important for not only de­
veloping the social insurance system but for developing the Finnish healthcare sys­
tem in general. Knowledge of the incentives for firms is crucial because it defines 
the success of different reforms aimed to not only influence the market but also to 
improve the wellbeing of patients. 
The research questions of this doctoral dissertation are all related to the functioning 
of the market and the incentives of firms to compete for patients on quality. Theo­
retical predictions show that competition and regulation (together with factors as­
sociated to these concepts) have an impact on firms’ behaviour regarding price and 
quality decisions in health care (see e.g. Folland et al. 2007; Gaynor and Town 2011). 
In the empirical studies, different estimations of, for example, the expected toughness 
of competition and its impact on the outcome are used in estimating the relationship 
in different contexts. 
As regards theory, I want to answer the following question: Under different pricing 
schemes, is market competitiveness associated with firms’ incentives in respect to 
quality (and price) decisions? 
To find a reply to this question, the following empirical questions need answers: 
1) Does competition have an effect on quality in physiotherapy when prices are regu­
lated? 
2) Does competition have an effect on price and quality in physiotherapy (when 
prices are determined by firms)? 
3) Do price regulation and freedom of choice have an effect on quality in physi­
otherapy? 
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The thesis is structured as follows: First, Chapter 2 describes the theoretical frame­
work; how differences between administratively set prices and market-determined 
prices affect the incentives of firms to engage in quality competition. Also, the theo­
retical predictions of price regulation and especially cost containment are discussed 
in the chapter. Chapter 3 reviews the empirical literature on competition and qual­
ity as well as literature regarding price regulation. Institutional details of the Kela 
rehabilitation system are presented in Chapter 4. The aims of the studies as well as 
the research questions of each study are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents 
the data, variables and methods, and Chapter 7 presents the results. Chapter 8 sum­
marises the results and discusses their relevance in the development of rehabilitation 
services in particular and healthcare services in general. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes. 
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 2 Competition, regulation and quality 
Health care has a major impact on well-being, and its size and costs also make it a 
challenging sector. Historically health services have been produced with non-market 
means, but during the past decades, many countries have relied on different market 
mechanisms, such as freedom of choice, in their effort to organise health services 
(Propper et al. 2008). It is argued that competition could be a valid instrument for 
making decisions regarding the use of resources, and the main target of using compe­
tition in health care is to enhance efficiency (Barros et al. 2016). Also, arguments con­
cerning equity have been made. Based on Le Grand (2009), for instance, free choice 
and the resulting competition are beneficial and improve the status of the poor and 
ill especially because with patient choice these patient groups are also able to change 
providers in case they are dissatisfied with the current supplier. 
When firms compete in the market, some pre-requirements must be met for the com­
petitive elements to be useful. For example, there must be several competitors in the 
market, patients have to have a free choice of providers, providers must compete to 
attract patients, and money must follow the patients. In addition to previous circum­
stances and practical requirements, different health policy initiatives are known to 
affect the incentives of service providers to enter and exit the market, invest, merge 
and innovate. The reaction to outcomes, such as prices, quantity or quality, depends 
on the firms’ incentives. Sometimes changes in these factors occur even though the 
aim of the original policy is targeted at something else. (Gaynor and Town 2011.) 
Theory and empirical literature differ substantially on different price-setting circum­
stances – prices can either be set administratively or they can be a strategic variable 
and be set by the firms (or be set in the market). Pricing naturally has a substantial 
influence on firms’ incentives regarding, for example, quality investments. (Gaynor 
and Town 2011.) When prices are market determined, both theory and empirical 
evidence provide unclear effects, but with regulated prices, theory strongly suggests 
that quality increases as more competitors enter the market (Ma and Burgess 1993; 
Brekke et al. 2006; Gaynor 2006; Gaynor and Town 2011; Gravelle et al. 2012). In­
creased competition means a higher density of firms providing services in the market 
(Brekke et al. 2011). When the number of firms in the market increases, the demand 
for a firm becomes more elastic with respect to quality and, therefore, firms choose 
higher quality in order to attract more customers (Gaynor and Town 2011). 
Previous empirical literature shows that competition has some effect on prices but 
the effect on quality is ambiguous. The effect seems to support pro-competition poli­
cies and theoretical predictions when prices are regulated. This evidence is found 
especially in the UK hospital market (Propper et al. 2004; Propper et al. 2008; Forder 
and Allan 2014). Still, there is evidence that incomplete and asymmetric information 
about quality may result in unfavourable results despite the pricing (Brekke et al. 
2014). 
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The following section presents theoretical predictions of competition and price regu­
lation on quality in health care. The literature reviewed is mainly from hospital mar­
kets, yet it also provides a framework for other health services, such as rehabilitation. 
2.1 Price regulation and quality 
Usually, in a regulated healthcare system, the main purpose of regulation is to en­
courage providers to keep costs down without skimping on quality. Also, when gov­
ernment agencies or insurers purchase health services they usually try to keep costs 
down without decreasing quality (Chalkley and Malcomson 1998). When prices are 
regulated, the pressure from cost containment is transferred to firms. Usually this 
change in pricing is hoped to force providers to intensify their production in order 
to bear costs. However, there may be incentives for providers to seek and implement 
cost reductions with other means. It might follow that firms will have an incentive to 
decrease quality in order to cut costs instead of improving productivity (Ma 1994). 
Due to price regulation, firms may also classify patients into profitable and unprofit­
able ones and aim to treat only the profitable individuals. The incentives to cream 
skimming may even become stronger with intensified competition (Ellis 1998). 
Price regulation is always linked to the financial incentives of firms, and the effects of 
regulation are likely to depend on a variety of factors, such as the nature of regulatory 
instruments and the industry’s economic characteristics (Joskow and Rose 1989). 
With price regulation, neither the cost structures of the providers nor the effort that 
high-quality production requires from the firms are perfectly visible to the regulator. 
For this reason, one of the main concerns in the formulation of regulatory policy is to 
determine how services should be paid (Mougeot and Neagelen 2005). 
It is known that the quality supply function is increasing in the regulated price, i.e. 
a higher regulated price will increase the marginal net profit from higher quality and 
thus create an incentive to increase quality. In practice, regulated prices are often 
based on average costs in health care, which implies that the profit margin will be 
higher in procedures that have higher fixed costs and lower marginal costs. More 
precisely, this means that, due to price regulation, providers may increase quality for 
profitable patients (where the profit margin is positive) and dampen quality for non­
profitable ones (where the profit margin is negative). Ultimately, the profit margin 
will be positive for providers that operate at volumes where marginal costs are con­
stant or decreasing. (Brekke et al. 2014.) 
As can be seen, price regulation may include a trade-off between intended and unin­
tended outcomes. Thus, it is important to combine price regulation and competition 
in health care. Meltzer et al. (2002) have shown that competition with non-regulated 
prices tends to increase costs, and price regulation without competition includes no 
financial incentive for firms to increase quality. Naturally, the prerequisite of quality 
competition with regulated prices is the patients’ freedom of choice (Brekke et al. 
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2014). It is hoped that after regulating prices, competition will overcome the un­
intended outcomes, i.e. firms’ behaviour to seek cost reductions through reducing 
quality. 
2.2 Competition and quality with fixed prices 
In theory, providers compete for patients with quality if prices are regulated. When 
prices are regulated, competition between firms will be settled with non-price means. 
With more competition demand becomes more elastic, which enables firms to cover 
the costs from quality investments and earn profits. (Gaynor and Town 2011.) The 
intuition behind theoretical studies is that with regulated prices, health care provid­
ers can increase volume and revenues only by increasing quality. Theory predicts that 
patient choice increases quality if it ensures a positive marginal profit. The incentive 
to increase quality is stronger, the larger the profit margin (Brekke et al. 2011.) When 
patients have more providers to choose from, demand will be more responsive to 
quality and thus increase additional revenue from improved quality (Gaynor 2006). 
Despite the rather straightforward relationship between competition and quality 
when prices are fixed described in the previous chapter, more recent literature shows 
the issue to be more complex. Competition indeed increases quality if patients are re­
sponsive to the quality differences of firms, if providers are profit maximisers instead 
of altruists, if the marginal cost of an additional patient is constant, if the profit mar­
gin is positive, and if providers meet whatever demand is generated by their choice of 
quality (Brekke et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, other factors such as profit constraints, degree of specialisation, soft 
budgets, cream skimming and gate keeping also have an influence on the quality 
outcomes under pro-competition policies. For example, not distributing financial 
surplus to decision makers could affect quality incentives. Similarly, the specification 
of financial targets may affect the outcome. A public provider may, for example, have 
tight profit constraints, and quality and other decisions have financial repercussions 
even though the provider is not considered a profit maximiser. (Brekke et al. 2014.) 
When considering healthcare services, at least three factors merit more thorough 
analysis: altruism, a positive profit margin and imperfect information. In health care, 
it is quite logical that providers care for the patients’ wellbeing. Brekke et al. (2011) 
have analysed altruistic healthcare providers in their theoretical study and have 
shown that with semi-altruistic providers there is an unambiguous relationship be­
tween increased patient choice and service quality when prices are fixed. In this case, 
patient choice has two contradicting outcomes. A demand more responsive to qual­
ity increases the incentives to decrease quality so that unprofitable patients would 
choose other providers. On the other hand, an altruistic provider wants to increase 
quality and thus patient benefit. Depending on the size of the conflicting effects, com­
petition will either decrease or increase quality. 
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When healthcare services are considered, the issues linked to a positive profit margin 
are also important due to possible capacity constraints. Health care is a very labour 
intensive industry, but also expensive equipment and instruments as well as room to 
take care of patients are required, and so capacity may well be an obstacle to quality 
competition. Naturally, the incentive of firms to increase quality is stronger, the larger 
the profit margin. Thus, an increase in the regulated prices will also increase the mar­
ginal net profit through higher quality. Increasing marginal costs, on the other hand, 
diminishes the firms’ incentives to engage in quality competition, and the reason be­
hind increasing costs may be capacity constraints. If patient capacity is limited, firms 
must either abstain from quality competition (i.e. from increasing volume) or invest 
in extra capacity, which will increase marginal costs. Therefore, the profit margin 
(and thus the incentive to compete for patients) will also be greater if the level of the 
fixed price includes investment costs (Brekke et al. 2014). 
Finally, imperfect information is also known to have a crucial role on patients’ deci­
sions in selecting or changing providers and, consequently, on the competition en­
vironment of the firms. Information affects patients’ responsiveness towards service 
quality. If patients start to react to increased quality information (i.e. quality differ­
ences) intuitively, providers’ incentives towards pro-competitive direction would 
also be affected. (Brekke et al. 2014.) However, in health care, patients’ knowledge 
about practitioner quality is usually observed ex-post. This means that some patients 
and health practitioners are a poor match and, due to switching difficulties, at least 
some patients continue using services from these imperfect providers. Yet, research 
has shown that with imperfect information, switching costs or patient errors do not 
prevent general practitioners (GPs) from competing with quality when, for exam­
ple, regulated fees increase. In fact, as services are financed with taxes, the costs of 
switching and patient errors could have a real effect because they increase costs to the 
taxpayer. (Gravelle and Masiero 2000.) 
However, opposite arguments also exist. In Finland (and elsewhere), there is evi­
dence that only a small portion of patients actually switch providers (see e.g. Junnila 
et al. 2016). Based on this stability in patient behaviour, it is sometimes argued that 
despite free choice GPs, for example, do not have to compete for patients after all (see 
e.g. Thomas et al. 1995). Still, there have also been claims that a mere possibility of 
change affects firms’ incentives towards the quality they and others produce and thus 
there is an incentive to compete (Le Grand 2009). 
As is seen, quality competition is a complex issue. Therefore, it is recognized in the 
literature that despite quite strong theoretical predictions of quality competition un­
der fixed prices, the effect needs to be settled within each empirical environment or 
market (Brekke et al. 2014.) 
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 2.3 Competition and quality with market determined prices 
When prices are market determined (or set by firms), both price and quality are stra­
tegic variables for firms. There is evidence from literature that price competition may 
lead to deteriorating quality. This is especially so if price competition is very intense 
(see e.g. Forder and Allan 2014). Gaynor (2006) has shown that during the 1970s and 
1980s virtually no price competition existed in health care but in the 1990s the situ­
ation changed. In their recent study on nursing homes in the UK, Forder and Allan 
(2014) found that competition reduced both quality and price. Within this market, 
greater competition reduced revenue, which in turn led to decreases in quality. Thus, 
it seems that competition worked through prices. However, other studies regarding 
nursing home markets in the US show that price competition in this particular sec­
tor is not much of a factor (Nyman 1994; Mukamel and Spector 2002; Mehta 2006), 
meaning that providers most likely have market power over the regulator, which 
leads to the nil effect. 
When firms determine prices, the incentives for providers to make quality invest­
ments will be affected by their return on quality. As increasing quality is costly, hos­
pitals will have an incentive to adjust their overall quality in response to changes in 
their competitive environments (Gowrisankaran and Town 2003). Kranton’s (2003) 
previous findings that institutional structure affects the incentives of firms seem to 
apply very well to the healthcare industry, when prices are determined by firms. 
The healthcare market is different from other markets of goods and services, which 
means that, for example, the incentives of firms must be considered carefully by the 
regulators. 
When firms are able to set prices freely, economic theory of competition and quality 
is unable to clearly predict the outcome (Gaynor 2006). Still, with theory, researchers 
are able to provide factors to look for that could influence the estimations (Gaynor 
and Town 2011). One important factor is imperfect information. Dranove and 
Satterthwaite (1992) have studied the effect of imperfect information on price and 
quality when consumers have imperfect information of both elements. The results 
show that when price competition intensifies relative to quality competition, firms 
will end up producing quality at a suboptimal level. Forder and Allan (2014) present 
an example of such a result as they analyse competition in the nursing home market. 
They found that competition reduced both quality and price. However, the study 
concluded that intense price competition reduces firms’ revenues, which then leads 
to quality reductions. 
In health care, such as physiotherapy, the quality of a provider is observed ex-post, 
but patients usually have multiple visits to health specialists. Thus, the provider’s rep­
utation will influence patient decisions, especially when information regarding qual­
ity is imperfect. Allen’s (1984) study focuses on reputation in a competitive market 
where the prices charged and sometimes even the quantity produced are visible to 
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consumers when they enter the market but quality is not. Prices reflect the level of 
quality produced, and firms will not lower their prices as it would change the incen­
tives and also signal to consumers that quality has decreased. Consumers are aware 
of the quality history of a firm, and this knowledge will eventually become generally 
known among consumers. Any firm providing a low quality product will see an im­
pact on reputation, which may endanger future sales. Therefore, if a firm is interested 
in its reputation and future sales, it will always have an incentive to produce high 
quality because consumers are smart and doing otherwise would result in no sales. 
Klein and Leffler (1981) were also able to show in their theoretical study regard­
ing imperfect information, quality and reputation that a firm will have an incentive 
to produce high quality if it is interested in its reputation and future sales. Shapiro 
(1983) notes in his study regarding imperfect information and reputation that with 
perfect information and perfect competition there is no need to analyse reputation 
because all transactions are settled in the market. However, when observing quality is 
difficult, consumers may use the quality produced in the past as an indicator of pre­
sent or future quality. Thus, the study shows that when consumers rely on reputation, 
there is an incentive for firms to initially invest in costly reputation building and thus 
earn smaller profits (or even sell at an unprofitable price). However, it is noted in the 
study that later on high quality must be sold at a price higher than cost. 
Despite previous findings regarding reputation, great uncertainty lies behind firms’ 
behaviour when competition and its effect on quality are considered. Kranton (2003) 
demonstrates in her study that industry associations may be important factors in sus­
taining high-quality production and that institutional structure within which a firm 
operates is critical for its incentives to produce high-quality products. Kranton il­
lustrates that if a firm is able to attract new customers and thus gain permanent in­
creases in its market share, it will have an incentive to produce higher quality despite 
having lower prices (and revenues) for a short period. The gain in future sales will 
overrun the short period losses that materialise after costly quality investments. From 
the customer point of view, the price reduction (and quality increase) will have to be 
credible or else a firm will lose customers. 
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3 Empirical evidence of competition and regulation in health care 
Evidence of the effects of competition on quality is mainly from the UK and the US, 
and studies have mostly focused on hospital markets. This thesis aims to broaden the 
literature and analyse the causal effect of competition as well as price regulation on 
quality in physiotherapy in Finland. Despite the literature mainly analysing hospital 
markets, it provides a framework for the physiotherapy market as well. 
Comprehensive descriptions of previous literature regarding the effects of competi­
tion on quality are presented by Gaynor (2006) and Gaynor and Town (2011). The 
authors divide the studies based on pricing, which is in line with the differences in 
theoretical predictions. 
Previous summaries of past literature describe very well the differences in the def­
inition and use of central variables in different studies. Examples also remark the 
difficulties in measuring that lie behind this study genre. In many cases quality has 
been measured indirectly as patient mortality (see e.g. Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor 
et al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015). Mortality reflects the quality of care but its use may 
have features that need to be considered during analyses. Patients are heterogene­
ous – they differ in their characteristics, such as the severity of their condition. Also, 
hospitals do not choose a certain level of mortality; hospitals rather make decisions 
of service quality which then affects mortality. (Gaynor and Town 2011.) Overall, 
measurement difficulties complicate the studies involved in quality issues as quality 
is multidimensional and, additionally, different patients may value it differently (Tay 
2003). Nevertheless, studies are quite uniform in one respect – they consider provid­
ers to be vertically differentiated in respect to quality. This means that more quality is 
considered better (see e.g. Gaynor and Town 2011). 
Previous literature defines competition in many ways. Many studies analyse the ef­
fect of market structure on quality and a commonly used measure is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all 
firms (see e.g. Kessler and Geppert 2005; Colla et al. 2010; Grabowski and Town 2011; 
Gaynor et al. 2013). Within these studies, competition is a measure of a hospital’s 
market share within a certain area. It is also possible to define competition as the 
number of competitors in the market as well as the number of mergers or demand 
elasticity (see e.g. Ho and Hamilton 2000; Tay 2003; Propper et al. 2004; Propper et 
al. 2008). 
3.1 Empirical studies with regulated prices 
As explained in Chapter 2, theory predicts that competition increases quality when 
prices are fixed and patients are free to choose providers. Intuitively, healthcare pro­
viders such as hospitals or physiotherapists can attract more patients only by raising 
quality. With patients having more choice among providers, demand will be more 
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responsive to quality; thus, raising quality will increase additional revenue. Such 
a prediction is correct especially if patient choice increases patient responsiveness 
to quality. If providers are profit maximisers instead of altruists, the marginal cost 
of an additional patient is constant, the profit margin is positive and providers meet 
whatever demand is generated by their choice of quality. (Brekke et al. 2014.) Assum­
ing that the price mark-up is positive and marginal costs are constant or decreasing, 
firms have an incentive to increase quality and volume when prices are regulated. 
However, if the price-cost margin of a firm deteriorates either due to very intense 
price competition or an unsuccessful level of regulated prices, they may have an in­
centive to decrease quality (lecture by Luigi Siciliani at the EuHEA meeting in Ham­
burg in July 2016). 
Prior events explain the multitude of results from previous empirical studies and the 
need for the effect to be settled within each empirical environment or market (Brekke 
et al. 2014). US evidence on the effects of competition on quality with fixed prices is 
mainly from the Medicare market. The results from these studies have more varied 
findings compared to results from the UK healthcare sector. Also, results alter by, for 
instance, condition (hip fracture vs. stroke) or the market studied (e.g. hospital vs. 
nursing home). In short, Kessler and McClellan find a positive effect of competition 
on quality, Gowrisankaran and Town find a negative effect, Shen finds mixed effects, 
and Mukamel et al. find no effects (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Mukamel et al. 2001; 
Gowrisankaran and Town 2003; Shen 2003; Tay 2003). 
As mentioned, the results from studies conducted in the UK are more positive and 
their findings lend more support to pro-competition policies. For example, Gaynor 
et al. (2013) analysed a healthcare reform conducted in 2006. During that time, hos­
pital pricing was changed from being market determined to being regulated, and 
combined with patient choice this reform was aimed to increase quality competition 
between hospitals. Despite the reform, it was evident that the restructuring would af­
fect different areas differently. More densely populated areas were likely to have more 
competitors and a high degree of choice. Rural areas that had highly concentrated 
market strucutres, on the other hand, were likely to have less exposure to competi­
tion. Still, the results show that competition saved lives (i.e. increased quality) with­
out affecting costs. The results also apply to non-profit hospitals. (Gaynor et al. 2013.) 
A description of the previous studies with fixed prices is presented in Table 1 (p. 24). 
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Table 1. Examples of previous literature on competition and quality with fixed prices. 
Study 
Competition
measure 
Quality
measure 
Main findings and the effect of competition 
on quality 
Country
studied 
Bloom et al. 
2015 
Number of
hospitals 
Mortality after AMI,
Management quality 
Management quality increased.
Mortality decreased. 
England 
Gaynor et al. 
2013 
HHI Mortality after AMI, 
hospital utilization, 
expenditure 
Mortality decreased after AMI, all-cause 
mortality decreased, hospitals facing more 
competitive pressure were able to find ways
to marshal resources more efficiently to 
produce better patient outcomes. 
England 
Grabowski and 
Town 2011 
HHI Urinary tract infection,
loss of activities of
daily living, physical 
restraints, pressure 
ulcers (both high and 
low risk) 
Nursing homes facing higher
competition improved quality more than 
facilities in less competitive areas. 
US 
Cooper et al. 
2011 
Number of
hospitals,
HHI 
Mortality after AMI Quality increased. England 
Colla et al. 
2010 
HHI Costs, length of stay,
institutionalisation or
mortality of hip fracture 
and stroke patients 
Outcomes vary by condition.
Hip fractures: competition increased costs
and length of stay, while increasing death 
rates or institutionalisation.
Stroke: competition decreased costs and 
length of stay and produced inferior outcomes. 
US 
Kessler and 
Geppert 2005 
HHI Readmission and mor­
tality after AMI of more 
severely ill and less
severely ill patients 
Less severely ill patients: Competitive market
has lower expenditures for these patients but
competition has no effect on quality.
More severely ill patients: Competitive market
has higher expenditures and higher quality
for these patients. 
US 
Gownisankaran 
and Town 2003 
HHI Mortality after
pneumonia and AMI 
Mortality ofHMO patients decreased.
Mortality of Medicare patients increased. 
US 
Shen 2003 Number of
hospitals
interacted 
with HMO 
penetration 
and financial 
pressure 
Mortality after AMI and
complication rates 
Interacted with financial pressure: 
1985–1990 = no effect
1990–1994 = increase
Interacted with HMO penetration:
1985–1990 = decrease
1990–1994 = no effect 
US 
Tay 2003 Demand 
elasticity 
Mortality Quality decreased. US 
Mukamel et al. 
2001 
HHI Mortality after AMI and 
complication rates 
Competition has no effect on quality. US 
Kessler and 
McClellan 
2000 
HHI Mortality after AMI Quality decreased. US 
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 3.2 Empirical studies with market-determined prices 
When prices are market determined, previous empirical quality competition studies 
have had varying results, and it seems that institutional structure affects the incentives 
of firms, as Kranton points out in her 2003 study. When market structure is defined 
as the number of competitors in the market (in line with the definition used in this 
thesis), Propper et al. (2004) as well as Propper et al. (2008), for example, found com­
petition to increase mortality (i.e. decrease quality). When competition was defined 
by the HHI, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) found competition to increase quality 
(decrease mortality) after heart attack and pneumonia. With the same competition 
variable, Mukamel et al. (2002) found competition to decrease quality. This means 
that mortality dropped when patients with, for example, acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI), pneumonia or stroke were studied. Some studies define competition as merg­
ers. Ho and Hamilton (2000), for example, studied the effect mergers and acquisi­
tions have on the mortality of heart attack and stroke patients, on the readmission of 
heart attack patients and the discharge of newborn babies. They found varying results 
based on patient status – mergers had no effect on mortality while readmission rates 
and early discharge increased. 
Two previous studies analyse the effect of price changes (i.e. changes in the competi­
tive environment) on quality. Propper et al. (2008) analyse the UK healthcare market 
especially during an earlier policy regime, where competition was introduced in 1991 
and abolished in 1997. In this regime, prices were negotiated and measures of qual­
ity very limited and not publicly available. Due to changes in the payment system, 
hospitals no longer received their annual budgets from the central government. Thus, 
the change appeared as follows: in the pre-reform period, the annual revenues of hos­
pitals were known and costs were reasonably certain. During the post-reform period, 
costs remained quite certain but the possibility to earn revenue became uncertain 
and dependent on contracts. The results show that death rates were higher in areas 
with more competition. The study also suggests that hospital income is associated 
with lower death rates, which means that with fewer resources hospitals had greater 
problems in maintaining quality. 
Volpp et al. (2003) have studied the effect of price deregulation on mortality after 
heart attack. The aim of the paper was to determine whether mortality rates for pa­
tients with AMI changed after subsidies for hospital care were reduced due to a gov­
ernment-administered reform. During the reform, the hospitals’ payments changed 
from having fixed prices to being subject to price competition in which the rate­
setting system was based on costs. The study found that quality decreased. The in­
troduction of hospital price competition and reductions in subsidies for hospital care 
of the uninsured were associated with an increased mortality rate among uninsured 
and AMI patients. A description of the previous studies with non-regulated prices are 
presented in Table 2 (p. 26). 
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Table 2. Examples of previous literature on competition and quality with non-fixed prices. 
Study 
Competition
measure 
Quality
measure 
Main findings and the effect of
competition on quality 
Country
studied 
Forder and Allan 
2014 
Distance weighted 
HHI 
Quality rating of nursing 
homes 
Quality (and price) decreased UK 
Propper et al. 
2008 
Number of hospitals,
price deregulation 
AMI mortality Mortality increased (quality
decrased) 
UK 
Propper et al. 
2004 
Number of hospitals Mortality Mortality increased (quality
decreased) 
UK 
Volpp et al. 2003 Price deregulation Mortality Mortality increased (quality
decreased) 
US 
Gowrisankaran 
and Town 2003 
HHI Pneumonia and AMI 
mortality 
Mortality decreased (quality
increased) 
US 
Sari 2002 HHI In-hospital complica­
tions such as wound
infections
Higher market concentration 
decreased quality. Higher man­
aged care penetration increases
quality. 
US 
Mukamel et al. 
2002 
HHI Excess mortality after
all causes and more 
specifically after AMI, 
CHF, pneumonia, stroke 
Mortality increased (quality
decreased) 
US 
Ho and Hamilton 
2000 
Mergers Mortality, readmissions No effect on inpatient mortality; 
readmission rates increased in 
some cases 
US 
3.3 Empirical studies of price regulation 
The following examples from empirical literature regarding price regulation and 
quality are not meant to focus on different pricing schemes per se but rather to illus­
trate the financial incentives price regulation holds in health care. Recent literature is 
also mainly from the US and the UK. In the US, the Medicare Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) was introduced in 1983. Due to this reform, hospitals became price 
takers instead of price setters (Shen 2003). In the UK, a policy regime was introduced 
in 1991 with the aim to separate providers and purchasers and increase competition. 
In this regime, prices were negotiated and measures of quality very limited and not 
publicly available. However, later on due to a change in government, this reform was 
abolished in 1997. (Propper et al. 2008.) 
Ellis and McGuire (1996) analyse hospitals’ responses to prospective payment. They 
show that changes in reimbursement have financial incentives to providers, which 
may garner three kinds of responses. First, changes in regulated payments may in­
duce hospitals to alter the intensity of services provided particularly to certain groups 
of patients. The authors named this a moral-hazard effect. Providers may also try to 
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change the patients they treat based on the severity of their condition. This is called 
a selection effect. Finally, providers may try to change their market share, which is 
called a practice-style effect. 
In another study by Ellis (1998), changes in reimbursement are shown to influence 
providers’ incentives towards the intensity of the care provided (i.e. quality of care) 
or patient selection. For example, a cost-based reimbursement results in the cream 
skimming of all patients. The PPS, on the other hand, increases the incentive to 
cream (compete for) the low-severity patients and skim the high-severity patients. 
The study also suggests that if firms are dumping the high-severity patients, they are 
also practicing skimming (Ellis 1998.) 
Shen (2003) has analysed the effect of financial pressure on hospital quality. The effect 
of financial pressure on quality might differ depending on which type of competition 
dominates the market. For example, in Medicare, where prices are regulated by the 
government, quality competition is more likely to be a dominant factor, whereas in 
the case of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) price competition may pre­
dominate over quality competition especially in highly competitive markets. Shen’s 
empirical analyses focused on hospital markets where quality was measured as health 
outcomes after treatment for AMI. Financial incentive was defined in two different 
ways: as pressure from the PPS for inpatient care and changes in HMO penetration. 
Due to price regulation, the PPS is likely to induce quality competition. However, 
HMOs negotiate prices with hospitals and this will increase the likelihood of price 
competition. The study shows that the two different elements of financial pressure 
create different results on patient outcomes – financial pressure has an adverse ef­
fect on hospital quality. The effect is strongest on short and medium term health 
outcomes while the effect diminishes within one year of hospital admissions. Both 
selective contracting with HMOs and price regulation with the PPS create similar 
incentives to cut costs and reduce the amount of care. The paper also compares the 
financial savings and quality reduction of the system and finds that the quality reduc­
tion is small relative to the costs saved by the PPS and HMOs. 
Dafny (2005) analysed the responses of hospitals to changes in DRG (diagnosis-relat­
ed group) pricing and found that hospitals responded to changed prices by up-coding 
more patients into groups with the largest price increases. However, the hospitals did 
not increase admissions for those diagnosis groups and foremost, the regulator could 
not positively influence the quality produced by the hospitals. 
Sood et al. (2008) studied the implementation of the PPS in inpatient rehabilitation 
facilities. The main target was to analyse the effect of changes in marginal and aver­
age reimbursements on costs and thus on health outcomes. The switch to the PPS has 
two potential and alternative results: It is likely to decrease the marginal reimburse­
ment for additional services and thereby induce providers to reduce costs. However, 
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it also affects the average reimbursement that a facility receives. In case the average 
reimbursement increases due to the PPS, it could in principle increase costs, and thus 
the implementation of the PPS could lead to an unambiguous result regarding cost 
savings and health outcomes. The study found that the implementation reduces costs 
by 7–11%, but the PPS had little or no impact on mortality or return to community 
residence. 
One of the more recent studies regarding health care analyses an activity-based pric­
ing (and especially the Best Practise Tariff; BPT) system and its effect on hospital 
behaviour. The aim of the BPT was to set prices proactively to reflect the costs of 
delivering best practice. If hospitals respond to the regulator’s pricing decisions ef­
fectively, payers could alter prices proactively to affect, for instance, the volume of 
particular treatments. In England, the price offered to hospitals for discharging a pa­
tient on the same day as the operation or procedure increased by 24% while the price 
for inpatient care remained intact. This change was meant to enhance productivity 
by chancing clinical practice. The aim of the study was to analyse the intended and 
unintended effects from the price changes. The study sought to find out whether the 
amount of patients treated as day cases had increased and whether the reforms had 
an effect on patient selection, quality or productivity. Similar to the present study, 
the authors used a difference-in-differences (DID) method in their analyses, as price 
reform only affected some of the hospitals or units. Results show that the proportion 
of patients treated as day cases increased by 11 percentage points. However, there was 
no evidence that readmission or death rates were affected. (Allen et al. 2016.) 
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 4 Rehabilitation services and procurement organised by Kela 
Kela has a complementary role in the Finnish healthcare system, and rehabilitation 
is an integral part of healthcare services both in primary and specialised care. This 
means that previous literature from (mainly) hospital markets provides a framework 
for analysing rehabilitation services as well. They are especially useful in analysing 
rehabilitation services organised by Kela, because Kela uses different procurement 
mechanisms, which influence firms’ behaviour regarding competition and quality. 
The history of rehabilitation dates back to times when fellow citizens helped sick 
or disabled individuals to adjust to the community and to improve living condi­
tions and life satisfaction. Rehabilitation began properly with the legislation of 1946 
(907/1946), but the increased amount of veterans in need of rehabilitation after the 
war actually created the rehabilitative methods. During the 1950s, rehabilitation was 
seen as action aiming to help people to return to work after being sick or action 
aimed at supporting people to stay active in work. During the 1960s, there was a de­
sire to link rehabilitation to other health and social services, and especially medical 
rehabilitation was seen as an integral part of good quality care. By the 1980s rehabili­
tation had stabilised its status as part of the Finnish healthcare system, and from the 
1990s the role of the patient has been enhanced and the focus moved away from the 
expert towards empowering the patient. (Puumalainen 2008.) 
In the 1960s, the rehabilitation section was established as part of Kela, which is now 
the single largest organiser and purchaser of rehabilitation services in Finland. The 
structure of rehabilitation is defined in the law (566/2005). Services include voca­
tional rehabilitation, rehabilitative psychotherapy, discretionary rehabilitation and 
medical rehabilitation. In 2015, approximately 112,000 persons received rehabilita­
tion financed from the National Health Insurance (NHI). In 2015 Kela’s budget for 
rehabilitation services was approximately 343 million euros. (Kela 2016a.) Figures 1 
and 2 (p. 30) describe the number of patients receiving rehabilitation services organ­
ised by Kela as well as their costs. 
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Figure 1. Number of patients receiving rehabilitation organised by Kela. 
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Source: Kela 2016b. 
Figure 2. Costs of rehabilitation organised by Kela (€ million). 
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4.1 Physiotherapy targeted for the disabled individuals 
Kela is obligated by law to organise medical rehabilitation, such as physiotherapy, for 
disabled individuals (566/2005). Kela grants medical rehabilitation, such as physio­
therapy, if the applicant fulfils the criteria defined by the law. For example, a person 
must receive disability allowance at its highest rate. Also, before 2016 medical reha­
bilitation was connected with other benefits (disability allowance or care allowance 
for pensioners at its middle or highest rate) but this mandatory relation has since 
been dismantled due to changes in acceptance criteria2. Medical rehabilitation ser­
vices for persons with severe disabilities are provided in accordance with a written 
rehabilitation plan. This plan is drawn up with a doctor. Usually disabled individuals 
See http://www.kela.fi/web/en/rehabilitation. 2
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receive physiotherapy once a week, and Kela grants access to therapy for up to three 
years at a time. 
The number of patients receiving physiotherapy (Figure 3) has been quite constant 
– approximately 14,000 persons receive these services annually. The purpose of medi­
cal rehabilitation is to support individuals with difficult illnesses and injuries (severe 
disabilities) to manage their ordinary activities and job-related duties. There are dif­
ferent rehabilitation activities (inpatient and outpatient) targeted at disabled indi­
viduals and they all aim at improving and maintaining work capacity and function­
ing. Inpatient rehabilitation periods last for a minimum of 18 days and, if necessary, 
a relative may join the rehabilitation. Outpatient rehabilitation, on the other hand, 
includes physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, psychotherapy, music 
therapy and neuropsychological therapy3. 
Figure 3. Number of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy organised by Kela. 
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Medical rehabilitation is targeted at disabled individuals under the age of 65. The 
largest need for the service is in the younger and older age groups. For example, in 
2015 the largest age groups receiving physiotherapy were children aged 0–15 and
adults aged 55–64 years (Figure 4, p. 32). 
See http://www.kela.fi/web/en/rehabilitation. 3
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Figure 4. Distribution by age of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy organised by Kela in 2015. 
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The costs of physiotherapy have increased steadily during recent years. In 2015, Kela’s 
budget for physiotherapy was 73.5 million euros (Figure 5). Since the amount of pa­
tients has remained quite constant, the average revenue for firms per patient has in­
creased from 3,535 euros in 2011 to 4,990 euros in 2015. 
Figure 5. Cost of physiotherapy for disabled individuals organised by Kela (€ million). 
€ million
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Physiotherapy for disabled individuals is different from the general physiotherapy 
market because patients are entitled to these particular services by law, services are 
organised by Kela and they are financed from the NHI. There are no out-of-pocket 
payments for patients and firms have to take part in a procurement process before 
they can provide service. Also, physiotherapy for disabled individuals is quite intense 
because they typically receive therapy regularly (e.g. once a week) for many years 
compared to general physiotherapy which is usually provided for a shorter periods 
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of time. Also, services are provided by private entrepreneurs only. The physiotherapy 
market for disabled individuals accounts for approximately 22% of the physiotherapy 
services produced in Finland, and approximately 40% of all physiotherapy firms are 
Kela’s service providers (Pekola et al. 2017a; Pekola et al. 2017b). 
4.2 Procurement of rehabilitation services 
The law mandates that Kela is either to produce rehabilitation services itself or pur­
chase them from the private sector (566/2005). At the moment, all rehabilitation ser­
vices financed from the NHI are purchased from the private sector. The main method 
of acquiring a sufficient number of service providers to different Kela insurance dis­
tricts is competitive bidding, in which Kela adheres to the legislation guiding public 
procurement procedures. 
The national law on public procurement is based on the European Union (EU) public 
procurement directives, which date back to 1960s. In 2004, the European Council 
and the European Parliament accepted two directives that aimed at clarifying, sim­
plifying and modernising existing European legislation on public procurement4. In 
addition to public procurement directives, other EU legislation governs procurement 
and the ways different countries implement procurement principles. In addition to 
national legislation and EU directives, Finnish contracting authorities adhere to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2016.) 
In Finland, the Act on Public Contracts (348/2007) and its revised regulations from 
2010 define procurement in detail. The purpose of this Act is to increase the effi­
ciency of the use of public funds, promote high-quality procurement and safeguard 
equal opportunities for companies and other communities in offering commodities 
or services. This means that when goods are acquired with public funds, procurement 
procedures must follow procurement legislation that covers, for instance, tendering 
procedures and contracting. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2016.) 
4.2.1 Competitive bidding 
Kela organises competitive bidding to have enough providers to produce different 
rehabilitation services. For example, in physiotherapy targeted at disabled individu­
als, competitive bidding is the main method of organising the service, and tendering 
is usually carried out every four years. Bidding processes are conducted in different 
Kela insurance districts separately because physiotherapy services must be provided 
close to a patient’s home, workplace, school or day care. The purpose of the procure­
ment is to create a pool of eligible firms for each Kela insurance district. 
See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/eu_public_directives_en.htm. 4
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The process and procedures of competitive bidding as well as regulation regarding 
the organisation of rehabilitation services are strictly defined in the law (566/2005; 
348/2007). According to the procedures defined in the Act on Public Contracts 
(348/2007), Kela must publish invitations to tender on the internet5 because usually
the value of the procurement exceeds the threshold defined in the law. The minimum 
quality of the service, as well as other requirements for the service providers are de­
fined in the request for tender. 
Firms, on the other hand, define their quality, price (for a 45-minute therapy session) 
and capacity in their tenders. During the procurement process, Kela assesses the 
tenders and scores those fulfilling the minimum requirements for quality and price. 
Scored quality could be defined as quality investments of firms because the actual 
outcome of care is not scored. For example, during the contract periods 2007–2010 
and 2011–2014, quality scoring was targeted at therapists’ education and work expe­
rience as well as the premises and their quality, the quality of the equipment and the 
extent to which a firm conformed to Kela’s quality standard. 
After scoring, tenders are compared and ranked based on their quality-price ratio 
(qpr). The final qpr defines the order of the tenders; tenders with the worst qpr do 
not receive a contract. Firms accepted as service providers based on accepted tenders 
sign a written contract with Kela that is valid for four years. The contract defines the 
terms of service production during the contract period. For example, the quality of 
the service may not decrease during the four-year period, and the price can only 
increase by predefined yearly indexes. During the contract period, the actions of the 
firms are also subject to auditing. 
Each Kela insurance district makes contracts based on local need (e.g. the amount of 
demand in the area). The purpose of the procurement process is to create a pool of 
eligible firms for each Kela insurance district. After contracting, patients may choose 
proper service providers6 from their local area based on their individual preferences. 
For example, in 2011 Kela had 1,320 physiotherapy service providers in 336 munici­
palities. In the same year, 1,202 firms provided services after participating in com­
petitive bidding. 
During the contract period, service providers are compensated from the NHI only 
if a patient has selected them to provide services and the physiotherapy has actually 
taken place. This means that money follows patients and thus patients’ decisions have 
financial repercussions in the market. Due to patient choice, firms’ access to the mar­
ket has two stages. First, they need to succeed during competitive bidding and receive 
a contract with Kela. In the second stage, firms need to compete against each other on 
5	 See http://www.hankintailmoitukset.fi (in Finnish and Swedish). 
6	 Patient choice was initiated in 2011. Before that Kela officials selected the proper service providers in co-operation 
with the patients. 
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy 35 
 
quality to attract patients, because there are no out-of-pocket payments for patients 
using the service. Patients’ decisions are also not likely affected by travel time or cost 
either, because all costs are covered for disabled individuals. 
4.2.2 Service voucher 
There has been a systematic increase in the possibility to use of service vouchers in 
Finland in the social and healthcare sector (1309/2003; 569/2009). Based on legis­
lation, patients may receive a voucher from their home municipality and use this 
voucher when in need of certain healthcare services. In this case, the patient may 
choose a suitable service provider from the private sector and the municipality cov­
ers the costs through the voucher scheme. (Tuominen-Thuesen 2009.) At least three 
types of service vouchers are used in public health care in Finland. Some are earn­
ings-related and require out-of-pocket payments, some have fixed prices with out-of­
pocket payments and some are fixed-price vouchers per se (Sitra 2011). 
During the contract period 2011–2014 Kela piloted service vouchers in two insur­
ance districts (Päijät-Häme and South Ostrobothnia). The pilot was an administra­
tive decision of Kela that aimed to develop different procurement methods for Kela 
and to enhance patients’ possibilities to take part in the decision making of their 
rehabilitation. The price of the service was regulated, and the service was targeted at 
disabled individuals only. 
A pre-requirement for the pilot to be successful was to have a sufficiently competitive 
environment (an adequate amount of supply and demand). The chosen pilot areas 
had some distinctive and some shared features: the two districts are geographically 
located in different parts of Finland but both of them could be described as medium 
sized districts. In the two insurance districts, there are 26 municipalities with a total 
of 118 firms providing physiotherapy for 1,200 disabled individuals in 2011. Each 
municipality had 1–22 providers. 
Service vouchers were effective in physiotherapy for all firms within these insurance 
districts. Because competitive bidding was not an option, firms could only provide 
physiotherapy for disabled individuals if they decided to take part in the Kela service 
voucher pilot. Yet, the pilot differed from competitive bidding because the process 
was no longer regulated by the Act on Public Contracts (348/2007) and the price was 
regulated by Kela. Kela announced the information regarding, for example, prices 
before the pilot began in September 2010. 
During the pilot, firms needed to register as service providers. Registration was not 
limited; rather, it was possible during the whole four-year contract period. Compared 
to competitive bidding the system was more flexible in this respect. As in competitive 
bidding, firms needed to fulfil minimum requirements (registration criteria) which 
included several issues. The firm must be entered into the prepayment register, and 
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insurances for their business (patient insurance and liability insurance) are required. 
Premises and equipment must be safe for disabled individuals, and providers must 
accept the regulated prices and declare that they will not charge the patients any extra 
fees. Further, they need to inform Kela of any changes in their business, therapists 
must have professional practice rights and adequate first aid skills and they must be 
acquainted with Kela’s quality standard. These minimum quality criteria are fairly 
close to the minimum criteria set by Kela for firms participating in competitive bid­
ding. 
After an assessment of the minimum criteria, firms received contracts with Kela to 
produce services for the disabled. Firms with contracts formed a pool of service pro­
viders from which patients were able to choose a provider from their local area based 
on their own preferences. Excess quality was not scored during registration. In this 
system, patient decisions have a financial impact on firms because they need to com­
pete for patients to get reimbursements from Kela. 
Providers were not able to charge any extra fees from patients, and during the contract 
period the regulated prices could only increase according to yearly indexes defined 
by Kela. The same fixed prices were used in both pilot districts, but the regulated 
prices had two categories, so different firms could have different prices depending on 
which price category they reached – the reference level price or the higher level price. 
Prices were also different for firms with and without premises. 
Firms could reach the higher level price if they fullfilled the quality criteria linked to 
the higher price. Staff quality criteria linked to pricing were 30 study credits of further 
education after graduation (a combination of longer and shorter courses) and work 
experience of 8 years or more. If a firm fulfilled the criteria, the price was increased 
from 38 euros to 45 euros for firms with no premises (or premises under 20m2). For 
firms with premises the prices were 43 euros and 50 euros. 
Because firms were no longer able to set prices, they needed to make decisions regard­
ing quality and cost containment based on the changed regulation policy (minimum 
requirements and regulated price). Due to the changes in pricing, the system po­
tentially had an impact on firms’ incentives regarding cost containment and quality. 
On the other hand, in 2011 freedom of choice was also introduced in physiotherapy. 
Thus, the system now had elements of competition that could have opposite effects 
on the quality of the firms. 
4.3 Patient choice in physiotherapy 
Following the trend of other Northern European countries (Vrangbaek et al. 2012), 
it has become a growing trend to increase patient choice also in Finland. According 
to the current Health Care Act (1326/2010), Finnish patients using public and tax 
financed healthcare services may choose between all public healthcare units both in 
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primary and specialised care. However, due to a vast reform in the Finnish social and 
health care sector, from 2020 patients will be able to choose from a mix of public, 
private or third sector primary care providers. 
Since 20117, disabled individuals (also called patients) receiving physiotherapy or­
ganised by Kela have been able to choose their service providers from their local area 
based on individual preferences. Patients were granted the right despite the procure­
ment in their area. 
The law (566/2005) dictates that services are compensated only when they are mate­
rialised and therefore patients’ decisions have financial repercussions. Thus, there is 
potentially a financial incentive for service providers to compete with each other for 
volume. When patients exercise free choice, price is irrelevant, since Kela is mandat­
ed by law to cover all costs. For this reason, from the patients’ point of view, service 
providers differ from each other in two dimensions: location and quality. 
To ease the decision-making process for patients, Kela established a website8, which 
lists all service providers in different geographical areas. Information regarding lan­
guage and communication skills is provided, but comparable quality information is 
not offered. Thus, it is evident that information on physiotherapy is incomplete and 
asymmetric. 
7 Before 2011 the choice was made together with Kela officials. 
8 See https://easiointi.kela.fi/palveluntuottajahaku/ (in Finnish and Swedish). 
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5 The empirical studies 
In an example of hospital competition presented by Gaynor and Town (2011), hos­
pitals first bargain with health plans to determine both the set of hospitals to be 
included in the plan network and the payment, and in the second phase patients 
choose their health plans. Similar events occur in the physiotherapy market targeted 
at disabled individuals – firms first participate in competitive bidding (or register as 
service providers in the service voucher scheme) in order to be contracted with Kela, 
and then patients choose providers from their local area. When fixed-price service 
vouchers were piloted, Kela changed the payment mechanisms for firms in the two 
insurance districts. Firms no longer determined the prices in the tenders, but firms 
were rather reimbursed based on the fixed amount regulated by Kela. 
The previously explained change in the pricing and implementation of patient choice 
was likely to affect the incentives of firms operating in the market and ultimately 
the outcomes, such as quality and quantity. Thus, the following theoretical question 
arises: Under different pricing schemes, is market competitiveness associated with 
firms’ incentives in respect to quality decisions? 
The general aim of this thesis was to evaluate different procurement mechanisms and 
especially different pricing schemes associated with competitive bidding and service 
vouchers by using empirical data and to analyse the causal effects of competition and 
price regulation on quality in physiotherapy targeted at disabled individuals financed 
from the NHI. 
In more detail, the main questions addressed were:
 
I) Does competition have an effect on quality in physiotherapy when prices are 

regulated? 
II) Does competition have an effect on price and quality in physiotherapy? 
III) Do price regulation and freedom of choice have an effect on quality in physio­
therapy? 
The objective of the case studies (articles I and II) was to estimate and clarify the 
effects of competition on quality when prices are either regulated (article I) or deter­
mined by firms (article II). Because pricing potentially has a large impact on firms’ 
financial incentives, the empirical estimations are analysed in two separate studies. 
In both analyses, the effect of market structure (number of competitors) on quality 
in physiotherapy is estimated, while in article II the effects of market structure on the 
price of a 45-minute therapy session are also estimated. It is relevant to analyse quali­
ty effects in physiotherapy because the market is potentially very competitive, patient 
choice was officially implemented in 2011, and two different procurement mecha­
nisms were used during the contract period 2011–2014. The main difference of the 
procurement process was the pricing, because patient choice was effective despite 
the mechanism of organising the service. Kela regulated all prices during the service 
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voucher pilot, while with competitive bidding firms were able to set their prices in the 
tenders. After registration or tendering, patients are able to select a provider from the 
pool of accepted firms. Article III analyses the effect of price regulation and freedom 
of choice on quality. As is known, it is common to regulate prices in health care. How­
ever, price regulation affects firms’ decisions and incentives regarding, for example, 
cost reductions. Price regulation transfers the responsibility of cost control to firms, 
but also the level of the fixed prices has an effect on firms’ incentives. If prices are set 
too low, firms’ price-cost margin may be compromised (turn to negative) and cause 
quality to deteriorate due to cost reductions possibly executed by decreasing quality. 
To be able to analyse these events, for article III, regulated and non-regulated firms 
were identified and the quality of both groups was analysed from two contract per­
iods (2001–2010 and 2011–2014). 
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6 Data, methods and variables 
6.1 Estimating the causal effects of competition and regulation on quality
In articles I–III, a causal relationship between the variables with theoretical impor­
tance is estimated. Economists study causality from the perspective of policy evalua­
tion. Policy questions require different tools, and analyses must always be solved case­
by-case, yet certain rules and expectations are known and used when causal effects 
are investigated. (Heckman 2008.) A randomised controlled study (RCS) is usually 
regarded as an optimal way to study a certain reform or event, because a controlled 
study requires only minimal assumptions of the units included in the studies and the 
reform itself. However, an RCS is usually not an option in economics when policy 
reforms are studied. A simple correlation is also typically not an adequate method, 
because causality claims require much more information of the event. (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009.) 
The definition and use of market structure includes deficiencies due to an endogene­
ity problem. For example, the HHI approach comes with uncertainty even if patient 
migration data is used. Higher-quality hospitals may have patients coming from a 
larger geographic area than lower-quality alternatives, and this could lead to results 
that high-quality hospitals face more competition (and have less market power) than 
the substitutes even though the result could be quite the opposite. (Tay 2003.) 
Due to the previously described bias caused by endogeneity, causality studies require 
the use of instrumental variables, and selection bias on the other hand requires a 
proper comparison group for the treatment group in order to distinguish treatment 
effect from the selection bias, for example. Overall, different groups may differ in 
both observed and unobserved characteristics and especially unobservable factors 
require more thorough investigation when causal effects are studied after a policy 
reform. 
There are three concerns linked to causal inference: First, a definition of hypothesis 
must be solved with the help of scientific theory. Second, there is the identification
issue of the model – causal parameters must be reliably and logically identified within 
a large sample free of any sampling variation. Thirdly, there is the estimation and
identification of parameters with real data. However, when all of these phases are 
adequately addressed, it is possible to define explicitly the relationships between the 
unobservables in outcome and selection mechanisms to identify causal models from 
data. (Heckman 2008.) 
Internal validity of the causal inference is the correct definition of the treatment. The 
external validity of a study is the knowledge of transferring a treatment parameter 
from one environment to another. The most ambiguous and fundamental problem 
is forecasting the effect of a new policy. (Heckman 2008.) In this study, I focus on es­
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy 41 
 
timating the effects of competition and regulation on quality. The units analysed are 
firms and the treatment is price regulation under fixed-price service vouchers. I also 
analyse competition under different pricing schemes – prices are either regulated by 
Kela or defined in the firms’ tenders. 
To be able to solve the previously explained causal effect of competition and price 
regulation on quality, statistical methods must be carefully used and implemented. 
The evidence of causality requires the use of, for example, the instrumental varia­
bles estimation and the difference-in-differences estimation (Brekke et al. 2014). The 
methods and their use in this thesis as well as data are explained in the following 
chapters. 
6.2 Instrumental variables estimation (used in articles I and II) 
If the regressor (X) is correlated with the error term (u), the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator of the β is inconsistent. In the previous case X is no longer exog­
enous, and there will be an endogeneity bias and thus an instrumental variables esti­
mation (IV estimation) must be conducted instead of using simple linear regression 
analyses. During the IV estimation, information about the movements in X that are 
uncorrelated with u is utilised through the use of instruments (Z), and therefore the 
estimations of the regression coefficient are consistent. (Stock and Watson 2007.) 
Despite being seemingly straightforward techniques, there are certain predefined re­
quirements for the instruments. First of all, the instrument Z must be unrelated with 
the error term. Secondly, the instrument Z must be correlated with X. This means 
that the selected instrument Z is relevant. Thirdly, the IV estimation is consistent 
and satisfying only if the instrument (Z) explains the outcome (Y) through X. This is 
called the validity assumption. Validity cannot be directly tested, because the unob­
served factors are indeed unobserved. The validity tests will only reveal whether the 
instruments are bad, but they do not state anything about them being good. Finally, 
the weakness of the instruments must be considered; in case there is any correlation 
between the instrument Z and the error term u, a weak correlation between X and Z 
leads to inconsistent IV estimations. Thus, in addition to multiple statistical tests, the 
use of IV techniques requires a lot of knowledge of the phenomenon being studied, 
and different decisions must be theoretically well-reasoned. (Stock and Watson 2007; 
Wooldridge 2010.) 
Gaynor and Town (2011) have noted that a market structure variable is endogenous 
in competition studies, and thus it is important to add variables that only explain 
quality through the market structure variable. The authors note that in the empirical 
setting of health care, the endogeneity bias means that due to the unobserved qual­
ity it is likely that certain providers have large market shares and thus it appears that 
these providers also have a high measure of market power. Therefore, in articles I and 
II, the endogeneity of the competition variable (i.e the number of firms) can cause 
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significant bias in the results, and thus instrumental variables (Z) that only explain 
quality through the market structure variable were added to the analyses. 
The estimation proceeds in two stages, and hence it is common to call the IV esti­
mation a two stage least squares estimation (2SLS). Both stages use OLS estimation 
techniques. During the first stage, the X is decomposed to two components: one that 
may be correlated with the error term and another that is uncorrelated. The second 
stage regression then uses the latter which is a predicted version of X achieved by 
using the instrument Z. With this technique, a consistent β is estimated. (Stock and 
Watson 2007; Wooldridge 2010.) 
6.3 Difference-in-differences estimation (used in article III) 
Difference-in-differences (DID) estimation depends on the presence of data of both 
control and treated units from pre and post treatment periods. Within estimation, 
the population average difference over time in the control group (Treatment (t) = 0) 
is subtracted from the population average difference over time in the treatment group 
(t = 1) to remove biases associated with a common time trend unrelated to the inter­
vention (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). In DID estimation it is important to be able 
to control pre-period differences of units in the treated and control groups. It means 
that both groups should have followed similar parallel trends if treatment had not 
occurred. 
Due to observational data, the DID regression was used in our effort to isolate the ef­
fect of the price regulation and freedom of choice on quality. Our aim was to estimate 
the treatment effect of the treated. For this task, in article III we have defined the reg­
ulated and non-regulated firms and their quality before (contract period 2007–2010) 
and after (2011–2014) the reform. In order for the DID estimation to work, the vari­
able that separates the treatment and control groups must be a binary variable. The 
variable indicating the time before and after the reform must also be a binary vari­
able. The treatment effect can then be estimated by using an OLS regression, but this 
requires the use of an interaction constructed from the two previously mentioned 
binary variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). 
It is possible to use richer models, and an obvious extension is to include regres­
sors other than the previously mentioned treatment indicator and time dummies 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). To control for the variation in the quality (Y) it is pos­
sible to add both time in-variant and time-varying variables to the model. We have 
added firm and market structure (municipality) level variables that are considered 
relevant for the analyses. The control variables used are, for example, firms’ potential 
patient capacity and the amount of patients in a municipality. 
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Due to the lack of multiple pre and post time periods, we finalised the analyses in 
article III with kernel matching (KM) and by testing the balancing property. By using 
matching methods, we aim to control the possible selection bias. 
6.4 Data 
All three articles make use of various data sources and statistical estimation methods. 
In articles I and II the aim is to estimate the effect of competition on quality (and 
price in article II) by using cross-sectional data from the contract period 2011–2014. 
Article III analyses the effect of price regulation and freedom of choice on quality, 
but in this article data from the contract periods 2007–2010 and 2011–2014 are used. 
Firm and municipality level data for studying competition and financial risk and their 
effect on quality were gathered by using different registers as well as procurement 
data from Kela. Data on the number of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy, 
the number of firms providing services for Kela in different municipalities and the 
sickness index of the population in different municipalities were gathered from Kela 
registers. Average rental rates, population of the various municipalities and physio­
therapists’ monthly income in the private sector were provided by Statistics Finland. 
Data on the number of physiotherapists in Finland, the number of staff in the firms 
providing services for Kela, and the firms’ risk rate, which defines their financial risk, 
was obtained from Suomen Asiakastieto Oy. Information on the number of years a 
firm has operated since establishing was obtained from the Finnish Patent and Regis­
tration Office’s database. Municipality-level data was used in calculating variables for 
particular Kela insurance districts. 
In articles I and II, data regarding the contract period 2011–2014 was analysed. In 
article III, also data from the contract period 2007–2010 was used. In all articles, 
procurement data and Kela register data were supplemented with data from Statistics 
Finland and Suomen Asiakastieto Oy. For articles I and III, previous register and pro­
curement data were also supplemented with firm-specific quality data gathered with 
a questionnaire to firms that took part in the Kela service voucher pilot. 
During the contract period of 2007–2010, there were about 1,460 firms providing 
physiotherapy for disabled individuals, but data from only 724 firms was usable in 
article III. Data regarding the contract period 2011–2014 included firm-specific vari­
ables from 854 firms participating in competitive bidding. Thus in article II, informa­
tion was available on 71% (854 of 1,202) of all firms providing services after tender­
ing. Procurement data included firm level data on quality, prices and capacity but 
only from firms accepted as service providers. 
Regarding the service voucher pilot (2011–2014), we were able to include quality, 
price and capacity data on 95 (80.5%) firms providing services within the two pilot 
districts in articles I and III. Price and capacity information was retrieved from Kela. 
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However, quality was not scored during registration, and thus quality information 
was gathered with questionnaires from the firms that had a contract with Kela for 
providing physiotherapy for disabled individuals during the pilot. Multiple question­
naires (altogether five with six reminders) were sent to the firms in 2013 (in Janu­
ary, February, March, April and November). Three questionnaires were electronic 
and two were traditional postal questionnaires. Despite repeating the questionnaires 
many times, an insufficient amount of respondents was gathered, and for this reason 
33 service providers were interviewed by phone in April 2014. The data and methods 
used in the articles are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Table 3. Data, methods and the data unit level used in articles I and II. 
Articles Years Data source Data unit level Methods 
I) Competition and 
quality in a physio­
therapy market with 
fixed prices 
2011–2014 Procurement data from Kela, 
Kela register data, Statistics Finland 
register data, Suomen Asiakastieto Oy
register data, questionnaire targeted 
at firms atteding Kela’s service voucher
pilot 
95 firms OLS, IV 
II) Does competition 
have an effect on 
price and quality in 
physiotherapy? 
2011–2014 Procurement data from Kela, 
Kela register data, Statistics Finland 
register data, Suomen Asiakastieto Oy
register data 
854 firms OLS, IV 
Table 4. Data, methods and the data unit level used in article III. 
Article Years Data source Data unit level Methods 
III) Assessing the 
effects of price regula­
tion and freedom of
choice on quality: 
evidence from the 
physiotherapy market 
2007–2010 
and 
2011–2014 
Procurement data from Kela,
Kela register data, Statistics Finland 
register data, Suomen Asiakastieto Oy
register data, questionnaire targeted 
at firms atteding Kela’s service voucher
pilot 
724 firms from 
both periods 
OLS, DID, KM 
Dependent variable: quality (in all articles) 
The variables that had theoretical importance and were significant in the models es­
timated are quality and competition in articles I and II. In all articles the dependent 
variable was quality scored either during the tendering (article II) or during the re­
search (article I) based on the scoring of the tendering. Quality was measured empiri­
cally as the sum of each firm’s quality attributes. The quality factors included educa­
tion (max 20 points), work experience (max 30 points), premises and their quality 
(max 6 points), quality of the equipment (max 6 points) and the extent to which firms 
complied with Kela’s quality standards (max 41 points); hence, the maximum quality 
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score was 103 points. In addition to these quality factors, Kela scored language skills 
(max 2 points), but that variable was excluded from the analyses due to missing data. 
Quality data from the contract period 2007–2010 were made commensurate with the 
quality from the contract period 2011–2014 by multiplying the 2007 premises and 
their quality score points by 0.4, the equipment score by 1.2 and firms’ compliance 
with Kela’s quality standards by 1.17. 
The analysed quality factors can be described as medium or long-term quality invest­
ments of a firm rather than as the quality of care. Even though it is unfortunate that 
it was not possible to use the actual outcome of care, the construct of quality physio­
therapy is known to be manifold: any measurement of quality can include how the 
service is organised, the way in which care is provided, the way in which information 
about care is recorded and used for evaluation purposes, and the outcome of such 
care. (Grimmer et al. 2000.) The quality assurance standards set by the Charted So­
ciety of Physiotherapy (2012) also define a variety of different quality factors in their 
quality standard for physiotherapy. For these reasons, quality analysed and used in 
the thesis is an operable measure despite its deficiencies. 
Independent variable: competition (in articles I and II) 
Our main independent variable in articles I and II is competition. As mentioned 
previously, there are multiple options in defining competition. Perhaps the most used 
measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares 
of the market shares of all firms. However, based on previous literature regarding the 
English hospital market (see, e.g. Propper et al. 2004; Propper et al. 2008) it is also 
possible to define market structure as the number of competitors in a market. 
Despite the procurement method being irrelevant to patients, distance to the pro­
vider is considered to be an important issue defining demand as patients are disabled 
individuals. For this reason, patients are presumed to make decisions among or be­
tween providers within their own municipalities. Thus defining competition at the 
municipality level is sensible. In article I, we measured the degree of competition by 
the number of firms providing physiotherapy services for disabled individuals in a 
given municipality. The reasoning behind this definition lies within the registration 
of the service voucher pilot. Because firms were able to register freely during the 
pilot, it was likely for firms to know their current competitors. In contrast, during 
competitive bidding firms participated in the tendering process simultaneously, and 
thus firms needed to consider all firms providing physiotherapy in a given region 
as possible competitors. Therefore, in article II competition was defined as all firms 
producing physiotherapy in a municipality and in article I competition was defined 
as the number of firms providing physiotherapy services for disabled individuals in 
a given municipality. 
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Approximately 40% of the service providers contracted with Kela to produce physio­
therapy for disabled individuals are self-employed entrepreneurs. Due to Finnish tax 
legislation, these firms are not obligated to report their yearly net revenues, which 
prevented us from using the HHI as a competition measure. As a robustness check 
we calculated the HHI in article I by using the amount of disabled individuals in a 
municipality and the number of patients treated by each firm. 
Instrumental variables used in articles I and II 
In articles I and II instrumental variables were used. In article I, two instrumental 
variables were included in the analyses: market level total capacity and square of the 
total population in a municipality. These instruments are correlated with the num­
ber of physiotherapists in a market. A higher market level total capacity is clearly 
positively correlated with the number of physiotherapists in the market, and total 
population takes into account differences in population density in different areas, and 
it captures the possibility of accounting for differences in the supply of services in dif­
ferent areas. There is also more competition in more concentrated areas. 
In article II we used three insurance district level instruments for both quality and 
price estimations. Our instrumental variables are the rental rate, the percentage of 
disabled individuals in the total population and the sickness index of a particular 
population. In line with Forder and Allan (2014), all of the instruments used in the 
analyses are variables aggregated at the insurance district level, while municipality­
level versions of the variables were added to the analyses as exogenous variables. In 
this way, all impacts resulting from the need for quality will be felt at the lower level 
and any remaining effect will be felt at the higher aggregated level. 
Demand and cost shifters in articles I and II 
In article I the total number of disabled individuals treated by the physiotherapists in 
a municipality serves as a demand shifter, and a logarithm for the average rental rate 
in a municipality (€/m2) serves as a cost shifter. 
In article II, the percentage of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy of the 
population of a particular municipality serves as a demand shifter, and the average 
wages of physiotherapists working regular hours serves as a cost shifter. 
Independent variables: price regulation in article III 
Price regulation (a fixed price service voucher) was implemented in 2011 for the 
four-year contract period (2011–2014) in two Kela insurance districts. In these insur­
ance districts, services are organised with fixed-price service vouchers, while in other 
districts services are organised by competitive bidding and non-regulated prices. 
Price regulation changed the competitive environment of firms by intensifying it and 
forcing firms to compete solely on non-price means. However, it is important to ana­
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lyse whether the change in pricing will have an effect on quality. We use difference­
in-differences (DID) regression in the effort to isolate the effect of regulation, and for 
this task, we have defined the regulated and non-regulated firms and their quality 
before and after the reform. 
Other control variables used in articles I–III 
For all articles, both firm and municipality level control variables were included. In 
article I, the number of staff working in a firm, the sickness index of the population 
in a municipality, years of operation since the founding of the firm, price and a loga­
rithm for the average wages of physiotherapists working regular hours in the private 
sector in Finland are used as control variables. 
In article II, a firm’s potential patient capacity, total population in a municipality, the 
sickness index of the population in a municipality and average rent levels in a mu­
nicipality were used as independent variables in both price and quality estimations. 
In article III, we added several firm and market structure level control variables into 
our analysis in order to control for other factors that could have an effect on the 
outcome. Our control variables included the potential annual capacity of a firm with 
respect to disabled individuals, the number of competitors (firms providing physio­
therapy) operating in the municipality, the average rental rate in a municipality, the 
number of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy in a municipality, the popu­
lation of a municipality and the price for a 45-minute therapy session. Our price 
variable was made commensurate by multiplying 2007 prices by the index of wage 
and salary earnings. We also used six dummy variables based on firm type (limited 
company, limited partnership, joint-stock company, sole proprietor, foundation and 
association) in order to control for management differences, among other things. 
6.5 Statistical estimations in articles I–III 
With previously mentioned observational data, reduced-form approaches were used 
in estimating the effect of competition on quality in articles I and II. Within this ap­
proach, the measure of market concentration is regressed on the variable of interest 
(e.g. quality) but also other confounding variables are included in the model. This 
approach makes it possible for researchers to let the data declare the relationships 
between the variables of interest. (Gaynor and Town 2011.) Still the declared ap­
proach requires measures to take the endogeneity bias in account. Thus, previously 
presented IV estimation (2SLS estimation) methods were applied. 
In articles I and II, our main analyses proceeded in two stages. We first provided 
OLS estimates assuming that (the potential endogenous variable) competition is an 
exogenous variable. In our second model, to correct for any bias caused by the endog­
enous variables in the model, the competition variable was treated as an endogenous 
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variable and the model was estimated by using IV estimation techniques. In article II 
this was extended to both quality and price estimations. In article I, the price of the 
service was regulated by Kela but it was also affected by the quality of the provider. 
Hence, the inclusion of price would only allow us to analyse the partial effect of com­
petition on quality within a price category. To get the full effect of competition on 
quality, the price variable needed to be dropped from the final OLS and IV estima­
tions despite the theory expecting regulated prices to be added to the analyses as they 
affect supply side decisions (see e.g. Gaynor and Town 2011). Partly for this reason, 
three additional analyses were conducted in article I as well as a response bias analy­
sis. First, we added insurance district dummies, and second, firm-type dummy vari­
ables to our IV estimation in order to take into account regional differences as well as 
differences in firm-specific business management styles in our analyses. In the final 
(additional) estimation, prices were included in the model as expected by theory. In 
article I standard errors were clustered at municipality level. 
When IV estimation techniques are in use, the selected instruments must be theoreti­
cally justified but they also need statistical testing. In articles I and II, the IV models 
were over-identified. Thus, the instruments used were tested for under-identification, 
weakness and over-identification. Also, a Stock-Yogo test for testing the weakness of 
the instruments was used. After a thorough testing of the instruments, the endogene­
ity assumption was also tested with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Based on previous 
testing, if a possible endogenous variable is shown to be exogenous, the main results 
may be drawn from the OLS estimation. 
In article II, two additional analyses were conducted as robustness checks. First, we 
added municipality-size dummy variables, and second, we added firm-type dummy 
variables to our OLS model. Smaller municipalities had less than 20,000 inhabitants, 
larger ones had over 20,000 inhabitants. 
In article III, the DID method was used in order to isolate the effect of service vouch­
er reforms, i.e. price regulation and freedom of choice on quality. For this task, the 
regulated and non-regulated firms and their quality before and after the reform were 
defined. The coefficient of interest (the interaction term, i.e. price regulation multi­
plied by year stating the period of regulation) forms after the average gain in quality 
over time in the control group is subtracted from the average gain over time in the 
treatment group. Basically, the method removes either biases that could be caused by 
permanent differences between the two groups or biases resulting from time trends 
unrelated to the regulation (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). 
Because the data in article III only consists of two time periods, the parallel trend 
assumption could not have been tested properly. This means that during the DID 
analyses it was difficult to confirm that the two groups (control and treatment) did 
not differ before the reform was implemented and thus the selection bias was pos­
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sible. To overcome these difficulties, kernel matching was conducted as a sensitivity 
analysis in this study. 
Another robustness check in article III was executed with a slightly different qual­
ity measure. The original quality measure is the sum of different quality factors that 
were scored either during the procurement process (non-regulated prices) or after 
firms replied to questionnaires that were sent during the study (regulated prices). 
One of the quality factors (firms’ compliance with Kela’s quality standards) was dif­
ficult to score outside the procurement process, because scoring involves judgement 
and, therefore, we modified our quality variable by removing this particular quality 
indicator and ran the estimations again with the renewed dependent variable. Finally, 
we also added firm-type dummy variables to the model in order to control for firm 
type time invariant factors in our analyses. 
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7 Results 
With this doctoral dissertation I wanted to answer the following theoretical question: 
Under different pricing schemes, is market competitiveness associated with firms’ 
incentives in respect to quality (and price) decisions? 
In order to reply to the previous theoretical question, I need to answer the following 
empirical questions: 
• Does competition have an effect on quality in physiotherapy when prices are re­
gulated? 
• Does competition have an effect on price and quality in physiotherapy (when 
prices are determined by firms)? 
• Do price regulation and freedom of choice have an effect on quality in physiothe­
rapy? 
The following sections present the findings from three empirical studies. 
7.1 Article I: Competition and quality in a physiotherapy market with fixed prices 
Results from article I show that competition has a statistically significant negative 
(yet weak) effect on quality. Results from both the OLS estimation and the 2SLS es­
timation find similar results. Results from the tests regarding the use of instruments 
indicate that the instruments chosen are valid and relevant. Also, weakness of the 
instruments does not bias the results. An important finding regards the endogeneity 
assumption associated with the study genre. In physiotherapy, endogeneity does not 
bias the results and therefore, the main results can be drawn from the OLS estimation. 
Thus, it seems that in physiotherapy, firms are less eager to make quality investments 
when competition is denser. However, the demand shifter (number of disabled indi­
viduals treated) has a positive and significant effect on quality while the cost shifter 
(logarithm for the average rental rate in a municipality) does not have an effect. 
In addition to the analyses, three additional estimations were done as a robustness 
check. Insurance district dummy variables and firm-type dummy variables were in­
cluded in the models. Based on the estimations, the results remained unaltered and 
it may be concluded that regional differences or differences in business management 
styles, for example, did not have an effect on the results. Finally, we added regulated 
prices to the models as suggested by Gaynor and Town (2011), but the main results 
remained intact. In fact, based on the response bias analyses, firms that did not re­
spond to our questionnaire were slightly smaller firms based on their yearly patient 
capacity. They also had somewhat lower prices and thus perhaps lower quality than 
the firms included in the study. Therefore, our results from physiotherapy with fixed 
prices are robust. 
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When market structure is defined crudely as a certain geographical area such as a 
municipality, it is impossible to control patient flow. For this reason, we calculated 
the HHI for different municipalities by using the number of patients treated in firms 
located in each municipality and the number of patients living in each municipality. 
Based on the results, the market for physiotherapy is very concentrated. Only 2 out of 
the 26 municipalities in the insurance districts included in the service voucher pilot 
had an HHI below 1800 (a value that is commonly used as a threshold for a non­
concentrated market). Also, when data was analysed separately for different markets 
based on the number of competitors in each, it was shown that quality was higher 
when only one or few firms produce services for disabled individuals. Quality then 
decreases as the number of firms increases, and with several competitors in the mar­
ket, quality increases again. 
The results found in this article are likely caused by imperfect information. Despite 
patient choice, Kela does not provide any information on quality for patients to ease 
the comparison and ultimately the choice. As quality information is not public, there 
is also no incentive for firms to invest in quality or compete against each other on 
quality. When firms determine prices, theory gives unambiguous results of how com­
petition will affect quality. On the other hand, when prices are fixed, the general the­
ory of competition and quality indicates that competition increases quality because 
providers need to compete on quality instead of price to attract patients. Yet it is 
shown that the causal connection is not necessarily this straightforward. Brekke et al. 
(2014), for example, show that other factors, such as imperfect information, influence 
the incentives for firms in the market despite prices being regulated. 
7.2 Article II: Does competition have an effect on price and quality in physiotherapy? 
In article II the effect of competition on both quality and price was analysed. In this 
article prices (as well as quality) were determined by firms in their tenders. As in 
article I, the analyses for both quality and price estimations proceeded in two stages. 
First, competition was treated as an exogenous variable and then as an endogenous 
one. This means that the first estimation was again an OLS model and the second was 
a 2SLS model. The selected instruments for the 2SLS model were aggregated at insur­
ance district level and similar variables measured at municipality level were included 
to the model as exogenous variables. Similar spatially defined instruments have pre­
viously been used by Forder and Allan (2014), and the aim was to test whether a simi­
lar formulation would be effective in this as well. 
Based on the results regarding the use and selection of the instruments, the under­
identification, over-identification or weakness of the instruments do not bias the re­
sults in either quality or price estimations. However, in line with article I, the endo­
geneity of the competition variable does not bias the results and in fact, the results 
drawn from the OLS estimation are valid in both quality and price estimations. 
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Based on the results from the OLS model, competition has a negative effect on qual­
ity at a 5% level. Results with instrumental variables showed a negative but non­
significant effect, but based on a previous endogeneity test, this result is not valid in 
physiotherapy. Despite previous findings, the strategy of using instrumental variables 
in a way that was previously used by Forder and Allan (2014) to tackle the possible 
endogeneity also seems to work in the context of physiotherapy. We were able to 
demonstrate that including aggregate-level instruments (insurance district) in the 
2SLS regression model and adding local-level versions (municipality) of the same 
variables to the analyses as an exogenous variable is, in fact, an efficient way to ana­
lyse competition when endogeneity is suspected. 
In addition to the two main models, we completed two additional estimations as a 
sensitivity analysis. First, we added municipality size dummy variables, and second, 
we added firm-type dummy variables to the OLS model. The results from these ad­
ditional regressions suggest that quality was slightly lower in smaller municipalities 
compared to larger ones (population > 20,000) but there were no differences between 
firm types (e.g. business management styles). Thus, our results from quality estima­
tions are robust. 
In article II, the causal connection between competition and price was also analysed, 
and the results show that competition does not have an effect on prices. We found 
that service providers have market power over Kela because the selection criteria for 
competitive bidding are not very strict. Also, Kela does not support free choice as it 
does not provide patients enough information on quality. Based on the results re­
garding the elasticity of quality with respect to competition, it was found that quality 
is inelastic in physiotherapy. This means that a 10% increase in competition will only 
increase quality by 5%. 
In line with article I, the imperfect information dilemma is quite apparent in article 
II and in physiotherapy in general, as Kela provides too little information for patients 
to act rationally in their decision making. As is known, sufficient and relevant infor­
mation is crucial in order for choice and competition reform to work efficiently. If 
freedom of choice is to have an effect on quality, it is necessary to rely upon a patient’s 
judgement and responsiveness to the quality of the service and for providers to react 
to the choices stemming from those judgements. It is known that only the presence 
of free choice has an effect on quality. Information about the quality of health care is 
quite often technical in nature and most patients have difficulties in dealing with this 
kind of knowledge, still the performance of service providers seemingly improves 
when information about quality is published. (Le Grand 2007; Santos et al. 2017.) 
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   7.3 Article III: Assessing the effects of price regulation and freedom of choice on 
quality: evidence from the physiotherapy market 
As explained in the previous sections, Kela’s service voucher pilot altered the pricing 
of the firms because during the contract period 2011–2014 prices were regulated. Be­
fore regulation, all firms participated in competitive bidding organised by Kela, and 
at this point firms defined their prices in their tenders. In 2011, patient choice was 
also initiated throughout the country. This means that the system had two potential 
effects on the market. Price regulation forces firms to cut costs and it is possible that 
firms execute this reduction through quality. Freedom of choice, on the other hand, 
increases competition between providers, and in such a setting firms need to enhance 
volume by increasing quality if they are to increase profits. 
Based on the results from the DID regression analyses, quality decreased after the 
reform. When control variables were included in the model, control and study groups 
did not have a statistically significant difference, which is crucial in this study setting. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we removed the competition variable from the model in 
order to control the possible bad control, but the result remained the same. As a ro­
bustness check, we also conducted similar analyses with a slightly modified quality 
variable because of concerns regarding the scoring of one of the quality factors (the 
extent to which firms complied with Kela’s quality standards). The results remain 
unaltered; however, the effect is much more modest in this model. This could mean 
two things: either the difficulty in scoring indeed overestimated the negative effect, or 
firms decreased their quality most in this respect. The firms’ compliance with Kela’s 
quality standards is probably the easiest quality factor to decrease because other qual­
ity factors (such as equipment or premises) are likely to react more slowly to price 
regulation. 
Finally, we also added firm-type dummy variables to our regression to control for 
firm-level time invariant factors but the main result was not altered. Thus, we con­
clude that quality was decreased after prices were regulated and freedom of choice 
was introduced. Based on theoretical literature regarding fixed prices, firms may car­
ry out cost reductions by decreasing quality. It seems that in physiotherapy the results 
are in line with the theoretical predictions and so we conclude that firms were not in­
centivised to compete for patients with quality. Instead, they aimed to decrease costs 
by reducing quality. The imperfect information present in physiotherapy organised 
by Kela only strengthens the results. 
The more a healthcare provider, such as a hospital, provides services under fixed pric­
es, the lower the net revenue it receives. Thus, the success of pricing must be evalu­
ated through the interests of both patients and providers (Ellis and McGuire 1996.) 
Due to imperfect information, the interest of patients is difficult to discern despite 
freedom of choice and, thus, the financial incentives of firms regarding price regula­
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tion are solved by quality reductions. The result is sensible as the evaluated quality 
assesses the quality investments of firms rather that the outcome of care. 
Due to the lack of data from multiple pre- and post-regulation periods, we were un­
able to test the parallel trend assumption associated with DID analyses. This means 
that we are not able to test whether the control and study differed before and after 
the reform. Due to this deficit, we continued our analyses with kernel matching. The 
results from the matching confirm our findings that price regulation indeed had a 
negative and statistically significant effect on quality. The result of the average treat­
ment effect of the treated is uniform (approximately −6 quality points) with the DID 
analyses with control variables and a modified quality variable. The matching was 
thoroughly tested, and the tests also assure that the result is robust and there is no 
concern that, for example, the selected matching algorithm would bias the results. 
Based on the results, it is evident that price regulation has decreased quality in physi­
otherapy. Freedom of choice, on the other hand, did not incentivise firms to compete 
against each other on quality despite theoretical predictions linked to quality compe­
tition with fixed prices (Gaynor and Town 2011). Because price regulation transfers 
the responsibility of costs to firms, by theory, firms may use quality reductions as 
a means to achieve these goals (Folland et al. 2007). It has been shown in previous 
literature that imperfect information decreases quality (Akerlof 1970) and the incen­
tive effects of providers are lower in any capitation fee when information is imperfect 
(Gravelle and Masiero 2000). Thus, the results achieved after concluding multiple 
estimations with empirical data are robust and in line with prevailing theory. A sum­
mary of the main results from articles I–III is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Summary of the main results. 
Articles Main results 
I) Competition and quality in a physiotherapy market
with fixed prices 
Competition had a negative (yet weak) effect on quality
II) Does competition have an effect on price and quality
in physiotherapy? 
Competition had a negative (yet weak) effect on quality; 
Competition had no effect on price 
III) Assessing the effects of price regulation and 
freedom of choice on quality: evidence from the physio­
therapy market 
Price regulation had a negative effect on quality 
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 8 Discussion 
Health care is an important sector for a variety of reasons. For patients in need of dif­
ferent health services, it is necessary that the care they receive meets not only the re­
quirements of their health status but also the expectations each individual has within 
a particular situation. From a societal standpoint, when services are financed with 
taxes, it is essential that the system is efficient, effective, equitable and of high quality. 
Otherwise, the system will lose the tax payers’ support. 
Historically, in many countries (despite e.g. the United States) healthcare services 
have been provided through centralised, non-market means. Yet, within past the dec­
ade or two, different market-oriented reforms have been adopted or are considered in 
many countries including Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Australia. 
(Gaynor et al. 2013.) Finland is also undergoing a massive health and social care 
reform that, among other things, aims to increase productivity and quality via com­
petition between providers in primary health care (and partly in specialised care) by 
enlarging the supply side to private and third sector providers instead of relying only 
on public providers. Competition is to be boosted by the implementation of freedom 
of choice – in the future patients will be able choose from all three provider groups 
(public, private, third sector) based on their individual preferences. 
Previous theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of competition and quality 
are mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom and it focuses primarily 
on the hospital market. The literature tells us that competition indeed improves effi­
ciency and has some effect on prices but the effect on quality is unclear. Competition 
seems to improve quality especially if prices are regulated. The intuition is that with 
regulated prices, firms compete for patients solely on non-price dimensions, i.e. qual­
ity. If firms are to raise profits, they need to increase volume. This is possible only by 
raising quality if patients have free choice and money follows the patients. However, 
there is evidence that usually the effect competition has on quality varies in different 
operational environments and markets. Also other factors, such as imperfect infor­
mation, affect firms’ behaviour is respect to quality, price and quantity decisions. (See 
e.g. Gaynor and Town 2011; Brekke et al. 2014.) 
In Finland, Kela uses public procurement mechanisms in its effort to organise reha­
bilitation services. However, it introduced patient choice in its rehabilitation services, 
such as physiotherapy, targeted at disabled individuals in 2011. During the same time, 
fixed-price service vouchers were also piloted in this particular service in two Kela 
insurance districts during the contract period 2011–2014. This means that instead 
of using competitive bidding and non-regulated prices in all insurance districts, the 
procurement changed in the two insurance districts with the major difference being 
the pricing. 
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Within this operational environment, it was possible to analyse whether competi­
tion and price regulation affect firms’ incentives and behaviour regarding especially 
quality and price decisions in line with findings from theoretical literature. With this 
thesis, it was possible to expand the empirical literature to rehabilitation and to the 
Finnish healthcare sector, as previous literature in this respect is non-existent. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse (within different pricing schemes) whether compe­
tition and price regulation has a causal effect on quality in physiotherapy. 
I want to answer the following theoretical question: Under different pricing schemes, 
is market competitiveness associated with firms’ incentives in respect to quality (and 
price) decisions? 
To be able to reply to this question, I need an answer to the following empirical ques­
tions: 
1) Does competition have an effect on quality in physiotherapy when prices are regu­
lated? 
2) Does competition have an effect on price and quality in physiotherapy when pric­
es determined by firms? 
3) Do price regulation and freedom of choice have an effect on quality in physi­
otherapy? 
Our findings from articles I and II, which analyse the effects of competition on qual­
ity with regulated and non-regulated prices, show that competition decreases quality 
in physiotherapy targeted at disabled individuals. The effect is statistically significant, 
yet weak. The results are most likely caused by imperfect information. Despite free­
dom of choice, Kela does not provide any public and comparable quality information 
for patients. If information were distributed, it would most likely help patients in their 
decision making, but based on literature, it would also increase firms’ responsiveness 
towards their own and competitors’ quality (Le Grand 2009; Dixon et al. 2010). 
In article II, the effect of competition on prices was also analysed. Based on the results, 
when firms participate in competitive bidding and define prices in tenders, competi­
tion has no effect on prices. The results show that when there are no out-of-pocket 
payments for patients using the service and when firms are likely to have market 
power over Kela due to legal obligations on how to organise these particular services, 
firms probably do not have an incentive to compete against each other with price. 
Article III analysed the effect of price regulation and freedom of choice on quality. 
The study shows that in physiotherapy, theoretical predictions behind price regula­
tion dominate, as quality decreased in the two insurance districts where prices were 
regulated despite freedom of choice. It has been stated in previous theoretical litera­
ture that price regulation must be linked to competition; otherwise, firms will have 
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an incentive to manage or decrease costs by reducing quality. However, as the results 
from physiotherapy suggest, information is imperfect and thus quality decreased de­
spite fixed prices and freedom of choice. 
Based on the procurement and regulation of physiotherapy, firms first take part in 
competitive bidding or register as service providers if service vouchers are in use. 
After receiving a contract with Kela, firms form a pool of producers where patients 
may select a provider based on their individual preferences. Despite this seemingly 
very competitive environment, the results of this thesis show that firms are not in­
centivised to compete against each other on quality. It is clear that firms operating in 
this sector have market power over Kela as the selection criteria of the competitive 
bidding are not very strict and, on the other hand, Kela does not provide comparable 
and easily accessible public information on quality. 
There are at least two questions worth raising that could have an effect on firms’ 
behaviour (i.e. competition) and our results: the patient segment (including the pro­
portion of disabled individuals treated) of the firms and patients’ enthusiasm about 
informed decision making based on quality information. 
In Finland, physiotherapy for disabled individuals could be considered as a separate 
market from other physiotherapy services because the patient’s right to these services 
is defined in the law. These particular services are organised by Kela and financed 
by the NHI. Compared to other regular physiotherapy services, disabled individuals 
have no out-of-pocket payments and they receive these services for years on a weekly 
basis (Pitkänen and Pekola 2016; Pekola et al. 2017a). 
Other physiotherapy services are organised in at least three different ways in Finland: 
services are provided by municipalities as part of public health care. In this case, the 
service is produced either by municipalities or by private firms through competitive 
bidding or a service voucher scheme. Some physiotherapy services are included in 
occupational health services, and physiotherapy is also provided by private firms, in 
which case patients are only entitled to moderate subsidies (the average being ap­
proximately €81/patient in 2012 compared to €3,535/disabled individuals) from the 
NHI scheme (Kela 2012; Pekola et al. 2017b). As is seen, the latter part of regular 
physiotherapy is largely financed by patients themselves and Kela does not control 
or organise the market. Instead, patients choose the provider from the market, and 
therefore the market design is very different from the one studied (Pekola et al. 2017a; 
Pekola et al. 2017b). 
It could be argued that firms which focus mainly in treating other than disabled in­
dividuals might not be incentivised to compete, i.e. invest in quality or aim at better 
service, for this target group in order to gain repeated visits and ultimately increase 
profits in this respect. The physiotherapy market for disabled individuals forms ap­
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy 58 
proximately 22% of all physiotherapy provided in Finland, and about 40% of all phys­
iotherapy firms had a contract with Kela to provide services for disabled individuals 
in 2011. The share of services studied forms only about one fifth of all production in 
the physiotherapy industry. Nonetheless, it could be argued that disabled individuals 
are most likely a desired patient group because they receive the service frequently and 
regularly, costs are covered by Kela, and care is provided for a long period (approxi­
mately 13 years/patient). (Pitkänen and Pekola 2016; Pekola et al. 2017a; Pekola et al. 
2017b.) Thus, for the firms this particular service is a steady income and the service 
should be worth competing for as it complements the firms’ product range. 
Another question is whether information will induce patients and providers to actu­
ally change their behaviour in this sector and whether increased information will in­
crease competition. Despite the fact that, in health care, patients are not very eager to 
make active choices and many base their decisions on other than outcome variables 
(Victoor et al. 2012), it could be argued that efforts to increase available information 
are worth taking. First, patients highly appreciate the right to choose (Dixon et al. 
2010; Junnila et al. 2016) and disabled individuals make no difference. In fact, over 
80% of disabled individuals receiving physiotherapy consider the right very impor­
tant or important (Pitkänen and Pekola 2016). Therefore, it is vital that information 
is also provided or there is no sense in implementing choice policy at all. 
In addition, information affects providers as well. Based on Dixon et al. (2010), for 
example, a key aspect of how providers respond to patient choice is how they inter­
pret the signals that patients implicitly send through the choices they make. Provid­
ers also monitor and analyse market information. A special interest of providers in 
the previous Dixon et al. study was the waiting time, but there was evidence that 
providers use information to improve services. 
Despite previous signals, results from studies regarding report cards indicate mixed 
results. Some studies have found that, for example, in the hospital market, public in­
formation of patients’ health outcomes has incentivised hospitals to cream skimming 
in order to improve available information on treatment results. However, results also 
show that public information has somewhat increased patients’ willingness to seek 
treatment from better quality hospitals (Bundorf et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2011). Thus, 
based on previous results, information is crucial and affects both the demand and 
supply side, and the effect most likely occurs in physiotherapy as well. In spite of the 
current trend of stable patient relationships, disabled individuals are a very experi­
enced patient group because service is delivered frequently for a long period of time. 
Also for this reason, competition and freedom of choice should encourage firms to 
invest in quality if publicly available quality information is provided. Until then, the 
power of incentives that information holds when free choice is in use is missed. 
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To sum up the results, it is evident that the incentive structure needs more focus from 
the regulator when health care is organised by using different market mechanisms. 
As the service is tax financed, all benefits drawn from competition (i.e higher quality 
and better efficiency) promote patient well-being but also push the system towards 
being more legitimate in the face of economic burden through taxes. Most impor­
tantly, quality competition would benefit patients because it is never a disadvantage 
for patients if providers exercise competition in health care (Gaynor and Town 2011). 
This is especially true, when the regulator builds an incentive structure that steers 
production in the desired direction. 
From competitive bidding to regulated price service vouchers and free choice in 
physiotherapy. Finland is undergoing a massive health and social care reform that 
also aims to increase competition and freedom of choice especially in primary care. 
The aim is to enhance productivity especially in primary health care. Based on these 
developments, the findings of this thesis are important, and so are future actions 
because the costs of health care are constantly increasing, yet patients have faced dif­
ficulties in, for instance, access to care especially in primary care. 
Kela introduced freedom of choice in rehabilitation such as physiotherapy target­
ed at disabled individuals in 2011. Earlier, patients in this sector chose providers in 
co-operation with Kela officials. In addition to patient choice, Kela also uses public 
procurement mechanisms, mainly competitive bidding in organising rehabilitation 
services in Finland. The aim of the tendering is to enhance competition between 
providers, and freedom of choice could intensify that competition. When fixed-price 
vouchers were introduced in two insurance districts, the competitive environment 
became even tenser and thus had the potential to influence firms’ behaviour and 
financial incentives in the market even more. 
The logic behind previous regulation is this: When firms participate in competitive 
bidding, they engage in a two-stage competition process. First, they need to com­
pete on price and quality during the tendering, and after receiving a contract, firms 
compete for patients solely on quality because there are no out-of-pocket payments 
required from patients. Money always follows the patients in rehabilitation and thus 
the patients’ decisions have financial repercussions for firms. Based on our results 
from article II, firms did not engage in quality competition nor did they compete on 
price during the tendering. Competition was shown to have a slightly negative effect 
on quality and no effect on prices. The results are most likely influenced by imperfect 
information since patients are not provided quality or other information to ease the 
decision making in choosing a provider. 
Regardless of the poor results, quality did not decrease heavily and there was no ma­
jor increase in prices, although the rise was more than the consumer price index 
would indicate. This suggests that freedom of choice works to some extent in physi­
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otherapy but competitive bidding does not. Thus, Kela needs to focus more on the 
incentive issues when planning competitive bidding. Based on the results, it is likely 
that firms have market power over Kela, and it would be beneficial for Kela to try 
to influence this market power by focusing on the incentives that would eventually 
enhance competition. Also, the effectiveness of the care provided could be added to 
a list of selection criteria in the future and patients’ (and perhaps relatives’ or other 
caretakers’) opinions about the care should be surveyed, publicised and taken into 
account during the contract period and tendering. 
Therefore, the first remark of this thesis has to do with organising health services in 
general and using public procurement, such as competitive bidding, in particular. 
At the moment, Kela does not have a sparring organisation is Finland which would 
encourage it to constantly innovate and enhance its activities or encourage it to study 
the rehabilitation market and its incentive mechanisms more thoroughly. Thus, in 
the future Kela must follow societal development and especially the needs of patients 
and, if necessary, change its policy in organising services so that it would meet the 
expectations of tax payers and the citizens using rehabilitation services even better. 
If Kela wants to influence firms’ incentives, it needs to focus more on, for example, 
the tendering selection criteria. The effectiveness of care is also an important issue, as 
well as patient satisfaction with the care they receive. At the moment, many provid­
ers have had a contract with Kela for years, even decades, and competitive bidding 
is probably merely a formality repeated every four years, but based on our results, it 
does not affect their decisions on quality investments or prices. Thus capacity-wise, 
a balance should be found between tendering and freedom of choice – free choice 
naturally requires enough capacity but by intensifying the selection criteria it would 
be possible to influence firms’ incentives when they participate in competitive bid­
ding. Based on capacity data from the period 2011–2014, firms which had a contract 
during the periods 2007–2010 and 2011–2014 raised their relative share of capacity 
by 80% for the latter period and the capacity of the market is twice or even three 
times larger than the annual demand. 
When fixed-price service vouchers were introduced in 2011 in two insurance dis­
tricts, it was possible for Kela to further intensify quality competition between pro­
viders, as they no longer competed against each other on price. Rather, firms regis­
tered as service providers and those who fulfilled minimum quality criteria received 
a contract with Kela to produce services for disabled individuals. As mentioned pre­
viously, freedom of choice was also introduced during the time and, in order to gain 
profit, firms needed to compete on quality to increase volume and sales. Again, all 
costs were covered for patients and firms were not allowed to charge any extra fees 
from patients. 
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Despite this seemingly very competitive environment, results from article I show 
that Kela has been inefficient in promoting competition between service providers in 
physiotherapy. In spite of the theoretical predictions with fixed prices, firms were not 
incentivised to invest in quality and thus exercise quality competition. The market 
where service vouchers were tested was very concentrated; only two municipalities 
had an HHI under 1800, which is commonly seen as a threshold for a competitive 
market. Thus, it is not a surprise that competition had a negative (yet weak) effect 
on quality when prices were regulated by Kela and firms participated in the service 
voucher pilot. 
A completely other question is the combined effect of price regulation and freedom 
of choice on quality. As is known, we found competition to have no effect on qual­
ity but it was important to investigate what effect a service voucher reform had on 
quality in physiotherapy. Based on theoretical predictions regarding price regulation, 
the responsibility of costs is transferred from the regulator to firms when prices are 
regulated. In this situation, firms have two choices in tackling the cost demands. They 
either need to enhance productivity or they may end up decreasing costs through 
service quality. Article III shows that the reform introducing fixed-price service 
vouchers and freedom of choice decreased quality in physiotherapy. This means that 
theoretical expectations regarding price regulation and especially cost containment 
via quality seem to dominate in the market. On the other hand, freedom of choice did 
not incentivise firms to compete for volume on quality despite theory may suggest 
such an outcome with fixed prices and freedom of choice. Thus, with fewer resources 
in use, firms decreased quality instead of increasing productivity, and this effect is 
most likely intensified by imperfect and asymmetric information. 
Based on the results of this thesis, it is evident that a mere administrative decision 
to use public procurement, initiate free choice or regulate prices will not influence 
firms’ incentives or change patients’ and firms’ behaviour unless other issues (such 
as imperfect information) are tackled as well. As is known, freedom of choice and 
quality competition require adequate and comparable quality and other information, 
and this data must be publicly available. These efforts would balance the information 
asymmetry between patients and providers although information is hardly ever per­
fect – in health care or in any other market. 
Therefore, the second remark of the thesis is the importance of gathering information 
and distributing it to all parties involved. The regulator of health services needs to 
alter its strategy from simply organising the service to actively gathering and publish­
ing comparable quality information instead. It is known that not all patients change 
their providers despite comparable quality information being provided. Sometimes 
there are no competitors in the neighbourhood to switch to even when patients re­
ceive enough information. Still, as long as switching providers is possible, there is an 
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incentive for firms to compete for patients, and public information encourages firms 
to raise interest towards their own quality as well as competitors’ quality. 
Within the hospital market, the incentive to increase quality due to intensified com­
petition may be diluted if decision makers are not financially affected by their deci­
sions (Brekke et al. 2014). As firms producing physiotherapy all operate in the private 
sector, it can be argued that quality decisions are made intentionally and thus the role 
of the decision maker does not affect quality choices in the same way as it would in 
the public sector. However, information asymmetry has a big role in this sector be­
cause (regardless of the procurement mechanism) patients being unable to compare 
firms means that firms are not threatened by losing customers, which then dilutes 
firms’ incentives to compete against each other. The former situation could mean 
that firms only compete for new patients or patients forced to change providers due 
to procurement or other external reasons (e.g. a firm does not receive a contract after 
competitive bidding or registration and thus patients are forced to change providers 
or a provider retires) and not so much for patients who have had a longer relationship 
with a provider. 
The third remark is somewhat linked to comparable quality information and especial­
ly the desire for freedom of choice to act as a driving force for quality. When freedom 
of choice is introduced, both patients and firms need to start acting and reacting to 
quality differences of firms in the market. Based on theory, when the number of firms 
in the market increases, the demand for a firm becomes more elastic with respect to 
quality and, therefore, firms choose higher quality in order to attract more custom­
ers (Gaynor and Town 2011). Yet, Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) demonstrate in 
their theoretical study that a firm’s elasticity of demand is directly affected by con­
sumers’ capacity to observe quality. Therefore, all sides must be properly informed 
about quality but also about the right to choose a provider and the practicalities in­
volved. Here, the regulator must ensure that changing providers is made easy and 
flexible, and the contract between the provider and the regulator must guide firms to 
co-operate in a situation where the patient switches providers so that patient records 
are transferred along with the patient. Perhaps in the future digitalisation supersedes 
this phase also for rehabilitation patients. 
The fourth remark has to do with the procurement process and especially the measur­
ing of quality. The regulator should develop quality scoring towards measuring qual­
ity outcomes instead of measuring quality investments. Also, if competitive bidding 
is used in the future, different innovative procurement practices should be developed 
and used in order to maximise efficiency, effectiveness and quality. In case the system 
is developed towards an any-willing-provider scheme, different measurement indica­
tors regarding previously mentioned factors should be developed and the results of 
quality measuring should be published. 
The effects of competition and regulation on quality in physiotherapy 63 
As a summary, the regulator should improve factors that affect behaviour on both 
the demand and the supply side. By adding comparable quality information, both 
patients’ interests towards comparing and changing providers and firms’ incentives 
towards quality competition may be influenced. It seems that in the physiotherapy 
studied, firms have market power over Kela, which makes it wise to concentrate more 
on the financial incentives of firms active in the market during the procurement pro­
cess, as it is evident that neither the demand nor supply side is affected by a mere 
administrative decision of a regulator to alter the organisation of services. 
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 9 Conclusion 
Political rhetoric regarding competition and quality in health care is quite straight­
forward – competition will increase quality especially when prices are fixed. Based on 
previous literature and the results of this thesis, the effect of competition on quality is 
more ambiguous. Factors such as imperfect information are causing firms to produce 
quality at a suboptimal level, and price regulation causes firms to decrease quality to 
control costs rather than to increase productivity. Therefore, it is important to ana­
lyse and build up incentive structures alongside with the actual reform that would 
encourage providers to move in the desired direction, such as quality competition. 
It is evident that mere administrative decisions are inefficient in launching different 
reforms such as free choice or fixed-price service vouchers and inadequate in chang­
ing the behaviour of firms (and probably also patients). Thus, necessary steps should 
be taken to correct this. However, the regulator could also enhance its activities in 
facilitating information. 
Because starting to market services under freedom of choice takes a lot of resources 
and skills particularly from small and medium-sized firms, it would be important 
in the future for the regulator to invest in an information system that enables in­
formation gathering and distribution within the Finnish healthcare scheme. Equal 
and comparable quality information would thus benefit both patients and firms. The 
regulator must also change its position from being a mere organiser of health services 
to becoming a more active participant in the system and providing information and 
supporting patients in making choices. As Arrow pointed out already in 1963, there is 
a market for information, and in the future the importance of such a market is further 
enhanced. 
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  10 Limitations and future studies 
Articles I and II are unfortunately cross-sectional studies, and thus more research 
that uses data from longer time periods is needed. With a longer time span, both 
firms and patients have enough time to adjust to a new and more competitive envi­
ronment where choice might alter behaviour in both the demand and supply side. 
This would also enable more thorough and liable statistical analyses. 
Further studies with panel data and a more precise measurement of the competition 
variable as well as the effectiveness of care are also needed in the future because they 
would guarantee more accuracy. Future studies should focus more on the definition 
of market structure, for instance, so that the distances between patients and providers 
are considered more thoroughly. 
Analyses that measure changes in patients’ well-being or health outcomes are needed 
in order to draw conclusions about social welfare. Therefore, measuring quality as 
an actual outcome of care would be preferable in the future. Similarly, competition 
measures could be improved since measuring competition in a way that takes, for 
instance, patient flow into account should be considered in future studies. 
Also, we did not have access to the cut-off point used in the competitive bidding pro­
cess. Having access to this information would certainly add an interesting perspec­
tive in future studies because it would allow researchers to analyse also those firms 
that were not successful during the procurement process. Data regarding all patient 
groups treated in the firms studied is also needed in the future as it may have an ef­
fect on the firms’ behaviour and their incentive towards quality competition within 
certain patient groups. 
Based on previous limitations regarding all articles but especially article III, studies 
regarding quality competition that use more accurate data from longer time periods 
are needed. This is particularly important in the future when health and social care 
reforms are analysed. When parallel paths are properly controlled for, internal valid­
ity of the model is also accurately ensured. 
It would be important to extend competition studies to other fields of rehabilitation 
services (or other health services that use different market mechanisms and have 
consistent quality information) and continue the research with larger and more pre­
cise data sets. Furthermore, studies that analyse changes in the market structure are 
needed because pro-competition policy tends to have an effect on firms incentives to 
merge. Overall, it would be important to build up a research tradition in the field of 
competition studies in Finland, because so far research has been very limited. Future 
studies are necessary and important also due to the ongoing social and health care 
reform. The reform also relies on competition and freedom of choice and thus the 
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experiences from the social insurance sector would be beneficial in studying other 
health services as well. 
Finally, more competition studies are needed in Finland (and elsewhere) because 
health and social care in general is going to rely more and more on any-willing-pro­
vider mechanisms and freedom of choice (i.e. competition). Despite the fact that the 
general results of this thesis on imperfect information most likely apply to other fields 
of health services as well, it is known that competition and its effect on quality are 
affected by the environment or market structure of a particular service. Therefore, 
issues such as market regulation, provider incentives and patients using the specific 
service should be considered case by case when competition effects are studied in 
health care. 
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Different market mechanisms are used increasingly in health care 
around the world. Competition is hoped to improve efficiency and 
quality without raising costs. One mechanism of increasing 
competition among providers is the patients’ freedom of choice. 
Especially when prices are regulated, free choice is expected to 
incentivise providers to seek volume through increasing quality
and thereby make the system beneficial for all parties – patients, 
providers and the regulator. 
This seems like a straightforward mechanism. However, many
aspects – such as imperfect information – affecting provider
incentives must be considered for competition to be effective in 
health care. This study shows that despite the apparently
competitive operational environment, competition may not have 
a desired effect on quality after all. The reason is most likely
found in imperfect information and the lack of incentives it
produces. 
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